Category: News

Article by Emma-Justine Michaux

By way of context, Lay Justices are volunteers with no legal background who make binding decisions in both private and public family law cases. As they are not legally qualified, they are advised on matters of law and procedure by legal advisers.

This setting is similar to that of a judge giving legal directions to a jury in a criminal trial. However, legal advisers are not required to follow the stringent rules that apply to judges when summarising the facts of a case and giving clear and concise directions to magistrates, nor do they possess the same level of experience and qualification as judges.

In light of these circumstances, there was previously an automatic right of appeal against a decision made by Lay Justices, without the need to obtain permission.

Following the Family Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2025, changes have been made and, since 2 March 2026, permission to appeal is required in order to challenge a decision made by a bench of Lay Justices. An application for permission must be made by way of an appeal notice to the appeal court, meaning a judge of a higher level within the Family Court rather than the court below. Permission to appeal will therefore not be determined by a bench of Lay Justices.

The Explanatory Memorandum to the Family Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2025 sets out the following reasons for this change:

• It would provide consistency across the family courts by requiring permission to appeal regardless of the level of judge whose decision is being challenged;
• There is an increasing volume of private family law work undertaken by Lay Justices, and the change has the potential to reduce unmeritorious appeals and conserve court resources.

Although the majority of designated family judges were supportive of this change, some consultees raised concerns regarding the absence of statistical evidence demonstrating a widespread issue, the adequacy of existing case management powers, and the implications for the training and support of Lay Justices and their advisers.

The burden is now on appellants to demonstrate either that their appeal has a real prospect of success or that there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard.

Counsel Tony Muman appeared on behalf of the Secretary of State for the Home Department in a Civil Penalties appeal today in Newcastle-Upon-Tyne.

The case concerned the question of whether the worker had the right to work in a supplementary employment role with a second employer and also for the type of work he was doing. In part, the issue turned on the intricacies of being a chef versus being a cook.

In dismissing the appeal, His Honour Judge Thomas observed that it is right that the civil penalty was punitive in nature, that the Home Office was right to issue one in these circumstances, and that the Home Office were right to set it at £40,000 in part for a wider deterrent message to be sent. HHJ Thomas also ordered the Employer to pay the Home Office costs in full.

Tony Muman acted for the Home Office instructed by Danielle Cavannagh and the excellent team at Keoghs Solicitors. Tony is an expert in civil penalty cases and acts for both Home Office and Employers.

We are delighted to announce that Simon Haywood has joined Chambers from a well-known Chambers in Birmingham.

Called to the Bar in 2024, Simon will continue to accept instructions across all areas of Civil and Commercial Law.

To instruct Simon, please contact the clerks on 0121 237 6035 or by email at civil@halcyonchambers.com

Halcyon Chambers are delighted to announce that Oliver Dixon has joined Chambers as an Associate Member.

Called to the Bar in 2021, Oliver accepts instructions in Civil, Commercial, Employment, and Immigration Law.

To instruct Oliver, please contact the clerks at the respective email addresses (civil@halcyonchambers.com and immigration@halcyonchambers.com) or on 0121 237 6035

Article by Emma-Justine Michaux

The County Court judgment in Vehicle Control Services Ltd v Langley [2026] EWCC 1 squarely confronts an issue that has been bubbling under the surface of civil litigation for years: whether non-qualified advocates, commonly referred to as “solicitor agents”, are entitled to appear in court without their client present. Although not binding, the decision has the potential to cause serious disruption to a business model relied upon daily in courts across England and Wales.

Solicitor agents are non-qualified legal professionals typically contracted on a case-by-case basis by advocacy agencies, rather than being employed by the solicitors with conduct of the litigation. That was precisely the arrangement in Langley.  The judgment makes clear, however, that “solicitor agent” is a misleading description. It is not a term recognised by the Legal Services Act 2007 and wrongly suggests an authority that does not exist. The correct legal question is whether the individual is an “Exempt Person” under Schedule 3 of the Act, which alone can confer a right of audience on an unqualified individual.

The recent decision in Mazur v Charles Russell Speechlys [2025] EWHC 2341 triggered understandable concern among non-qualified legal professionals. However, the court in Langley was clear that this panic was misplaced. Mazurconcerned who may conduct litigation, not who may exercise rights of audience. Those are distinct reserved legal activities under the Act, and Mazur said nothing about advocacy.

This judgment, by contrast, addresses advocacy head-on. Relying on Schedule 3 of the Legal Services Act 2007, the court held that four cumulative conditions must be satisfied for an individual to qualify as an Exempt Person with a right of audience:

• the individual must be assisting in the conduct of litigation;
• they must be acting under the instructions and supervision of an authorised litigator;
• the proceedings must be heard “in chambers”; and
• the proceedings must not be reserved family proceedings.

The court stressed that advocacy alone cannot amount to “assisting in the conduct of litigation”, which is defined as issuing, prosecuting or defending proceedings and performing ancillary functions such as signing statements of truth.

The judgment also confirms that non-qualified advocates are not excluded altogether. In small claims proceedings, a lay representative may address the court provided the party themselves attends, under CPR PD27A and the Lay Representatives (Rights of Audience) Order 1999.

On the facts, the advocate in this case could not meet the exemption test. Neither he nor the advocacy agency had taken any steps in the litigation. The solicitor with conduct of the claim was not supervising or instructing him directly; instead, instructions passed through multiple contractual layers. This fell far short of the traditional model Parliament intended to preserve, namely in-house managing clerks or equivalent individuals working closely under a solicitor’s supervision. Although the hearing could arguably be characterised as one historically heard in chambers, that factor alone was insufficient.

The implications are stark. Advocacy-only agencies routinely attend vast numbers of hearings without clients present. While this decision is not binding, if adopted by a higher court it would place that entire model under acute pressure, with immediate and far-reaching practical consequences for civil litigation practice.

In a ruling yesterday, HHJ Ralton sitting at the County Court in Bristol dismissed the Employer’s appeal against a £40,000 Civil Penalty Notice, rejecting claims that the Employer had not employed an illegal worker or that the amount of the penalty was too high.  HHJ Ralton agreed wholly with Tony Muman’s submission and stated that it was quite extraordinary how the Employer presented a different case under cross-examination to the case presented to the Home Office and to the Court all the way.  He agreed with Tony Muman’s submission that the Employer had made up oral evidence to explain the illegal worker’s presence at the business premises.  HHJ Ralton also ordered the Employer to pay the Home Office costs in full.

Tony Muman acted for the Home Office instructed by Lauren Pritchard and the excellent team at Keoghs Solicitors.  Tony is an expert in civil penalty cases and acts for both Home Office and Employers.

We are delighted to announce that Muhammad Ul-Haq has been shortlisted for Barrister of the Year (over 10 years’ Call) for the Birmingham Law Society Legal Awards in 2026.

This in addition to Muhammad being ranked in both Chambers and Partners and Legal 500 this year for the first time.

Halcyon Chambers wishes to congratulate everyone who has been shortlisted in their respective categories the best of luck.

Tony Muman, led by Manjit Gill KC (instructed by J M Wilson Solicitors), succeeds in very important case on the Home Secretary’s power to stop an airline passenger from boarding a flight for reasons unconnected to terrorism.

The facts of this case are extraordinary.  Following a hard fought victory, the High Court ordered the Home Secretary to bring FD back to the UK at her cost and before Wed 17th December – at which point his Turkish visa expires.

The press summary is here. The judgment is here.

A full in-depth analysis to follow.

The SSHD has indicated that she will be appealing to the Court of Appeal on an expedited basis, which may lead to the Court of Appeal having to convene to hear the application before the end of term this week.

This is a fast moving case…

Tony Muman leading Muhammad Ul-Haq ​represented the employer

In a significant ruling at the Birmingham County Court, an employer successfully appealed against a £45,000 civil penalty imposed by the Home Office.  The penalty was issued for allegedly employing an individual, who was deemed to have lost his right to work due to an implicit withdrawal of his asylum application.  ​

Background

The case revolved around whether the construction firm had conducted proper checks to verify the employee’s right to work. ​ The employee, an asylum seeker, had been granted permission to work in the UK under specific conditions. ​ The firm argued that it had carried out all necessary checks, including verifying his Application Registration Card (ARC) and using the Home Office’s share code system, which confirmed his eligibility to work for 20 hours per week. ​ However, the Home Office later claimed that the employee’s right to work had ceased, due to non-compliance with asylum procedures. ​

Key Issues

The appeal focused on three grounds:

1. Liability for the Penalty: The firm argued it was not liable as it had conducted the prescribed checks and reasonably believed the employee had the right to work. ​
2. Statutory Excuse: The firm claimed it was excused from the penalty under Section 15(3) of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, as it had complied with prescribed requirements.
3. Penalty Amount: The firm contended the £45,000 penalty was disproportionate and would force the company into liquidation. ​

Court Findings

Her Honour Judge Truman at the County Court in Birmingham ruled in favour of the appellant, concluding that:

• The firm had conducted the required checks, including obtaining a Positive Verification Notice (PVN) from the Home Office Employer Checking Service, even though it could not produce a copy of the PVN during the appeal. ​
• The lack of a PVN copy did not negate the firm’s compliance with the prescribed requirements under the law. ​
• The penalty was disproportionate given the firm’s financial position and the circumstances of the case. ​ The judge noted that the firm had acted in good faith, openly documented the employee’s employment, and paid taxes and national insurance.

Outcome

The court allowed the appeal and cancelled the £45,000 penalty, citing the firm’s compliance with legal requirements and the disproportionality of the penalty.  HHJ Truman emphasised the importance of fairness and proportionality in such cases, noting that the penalty should reflect the gravity of the breach. ​ If the firm had failed to meet the statutory excuse, the judge indicated a reduced penalty of £5,000 would have been more appropriate. ​

Implications

This ruling highlights the importance of employers conducting diligent checks on employees’ right to work and retaining proper documentation. ​ It also underscores the need for proportionality in penalties, especially for small businesses that may face severe financial consequences from high fines. ​ The case illustrates helpful principles for future appeals against civil penalties imposed under the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006.

Tony Muman is an expert in civil penalty cases and together with Muhammad Ul-Haq was instructed under direct access.

For any booking enquiries, please contact the civil clerk at civil@halcyonchambers.com

In a recent success before the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber), Sonya Kalyan, instructed by J M Wilson Solicitors, secured the allowing of an asylum and human rights appeal for a Sierra Leonean national who had fled sustained threats, abuse, and persecution linked to both gender-based violence and imputed political opinion.

The Tribunal, presided over by a First-tier Tribunal Judge (“FTTJ”), allowed the appeal on asylum, Article 3, and Article 8 ECHR grounds, finding the appellant to be a credible witness who faced a real risk of persecution and serious harm on return to Sierra Leone.

Background and Context

The appellant’s claim centred on two interlinked narratives: her exposure to gender-based abuse and victimisation as a woman activist in Sierra Leone, and her risk arising from her association with her father, a long-standing political critic of the Sierra Leonean government residing in the United States.

Educated to university level, the appellant had engaged in campaigns promoting women’s rights and tackling sexual harassment in professional settings. She used the platform of a national beauty pageant to raise awareness of gender inequality; an event which later attracted political controversy when her father publicly accused the government of tribal bias and corruption in the selection process. His social media broadcasts, viewed widely within Sierra Leone and the diaspora, directly identified her by name.

Following these events, the appellant was subjected to sustained online abuse, threats, and harassment, forcing her into hiding. In the aftermath, her mother was targeted by unknown men believed to be linked to state authorities and later died in custody under suspicious circumstances.

Having entered the UK lawfully as a student, the appellant’s situation worsened when a former partner circulated intimate images of her online without consent; an experience which led to profound psychological trauma and reinforced her sense of exposure and danger.

The Home Office accepted the appellant’s identity and her father’s political profile but rejected her account as lacking credibility, alleging inconsistency and insufficient corroboration. It contended that she would not face persecution on return and could safely relocate within Sierra Leone.

Legal Framework

The case was determined post-Nationality and Borders Act 2022 regime, requiring the Tribunal to apply the two-stage test in section 32 NABA 2022, as clarified by JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) (Botswana) [2024] UKUT 100 (IAC).

The FTTJ summarised the legal framework by reference to:

1. MAH (Egypt) [2023] EWCA Civ 216, on the proper approach to credibility assessment in asylum claims;
2. Paposhvili v Belgium [2017] Imm AR 867 and AM (Zimbabwe) [2020] UKSC 17, concerning Article 3 ECHR medical claims; and
3. TZ (Pakistan) & PG (India) [2018] EWCA Civ 1109, confirming that satisfaction of the Immigration Rules on private life is positively determinative of proportionality under Article 8.

The appellant’s protection claim relied on two Convention grounds:

1. Imputed political opinion, derived from her father’s political activism; and
2. Membership of a Particular Social Group (PSG), as a single woman in Sierra Leone, a group the Home Office accepted faced discrimination and societal disadvantage.

Representation and Advocacy

At the outset of proceedings, Sonya successfully applied for the appellant to be treated as a vulnerable witness, relying on the detailed Report prepared by a Clinical Psychologist. The Tribunal accepted that the appellant suffered from moderately severe Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and Major Depressive Disorder (MDD), and accordingly applied the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No. 2 of 2010 to ensure appropriate procedural adjustments.

During the hearing, Sonya made detailed oral submissions supported by a comprehensive Appellant’s Skeleton Argument, engaging directly with both the credibility issues and the evidential gaps raised in the refusal letter.

Her submissions highlighted:

1. The internal consistency and plausibility of the appellant’s account, including her explanations for delays in claiming asylum, supported by her mental health evidence;
2. The gendered dimension of the persecution faced, including cyber-harassment and the misuse of intimate imagery as a tool of intimidation, contextualised by country expert evidence;
3. The report of the Country Expert, which confirmed that women in Sierra Leone continue to face entrenched patriarchal barriers, limited state protection, and impunity for sexual and technology-facilitated violence; and
4. The absence of any meaningful family support network or access to treatment in Sierra Leone, reinforcing both her risk and the “very significant obstacles to reintegration” under Appendix Private Life of the Immigration Rules.

In addressing the Respondent’s reliance on section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004, Sonya advanced a nuanced argument that delay in claiming asylum was explicable and did not go to the core of the claim, given the appellant’s psychological fragility and cultural stigma surrounding sexual violence.

She further submitted that the combination of the appellant’s gender, public profile, mental health, and absence of family support rendered internal relocation unduly harsh and unsafe, engaging both Articles 3 and 8 ECHR.

The Tribunal’s Findings

The Tribunal accepted the appellant’s evidence as credible, consistent, and corroborated by both the expert and medical material. The FTTJ expressly found that the appellant possessed characteristics engaging the Refugee Convention and faced a real risk of persecution on return.

In particular, the Tribunal held that:

1. The appellant’s father’s political activity placed her within the scope of imputed political opinion, and her own visibility as his daughter made her identifiable to state actors;
2. Single women in Sierra Leone constitute a PSG due to societal discrimination, lack of protection, and exposure to violence;
3. The appellant’s previous victimisation through “revenge porn” and her trauma-related mental health conditions significantly heightened her vulnerability;
4. There was no sufficiency of protection available and no viable internal relocation alternative as conceded by the Home Office; and
5. Given her health and lack of support, there were very significant obstacles to reintegration, and her removal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences, breaching her Article 8 rights.

The Tribunal found that the appellant’s treatment and anticipated harm on return would amount to persecution for Refugee Convention reasons and to a violation of Articles 3 and 8 ECHR. The appeal was therefore allowed on all grounds.

Significance of the case

This case underscores the growing recognition within the asylum framework of gender-based persecution, particularly where intersecting vulnerabilities, such as online abuse, mental health conditions, and political imputation, coalesce to create real risk on return.

It also illustrates the practical operation of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022’s evidential framework, and how careful case preparation, expert evidence, and trauma-informed advocacy can ensure that credibility is assessed holistically and fairly.

The decision affirms that women facing both gendered harm and political association risk are entitled to the full protection of the Refugee Convention, and that “revenge porn” and technology-facilitated abuse can amount to serious persecution where state protection is ineffective.

Conclusion

Through detailed case preparation, careful management of vulnerability, and persuasive submissions grounded in expert and medical evidence, Sonya Kalyan succeeded in establishing that her client’s fear of persecution was both credible and well-founded, and that removal would breach her fundamental human rights.

Sonya continues to accept instructions in complex immigration and asylum matters, including those involving challenging factual matrix and country contexts.

To instruct Sonya, please contact the chambers’ immigration clerk at immigration@halcyonchambers.com.

The views stated in this article belong to the writers in a personal capacity. No warranty is given, express or implied, in respect of the contents of this article. Nothing in this article is tendered as or is intended to be taken as legal advice and the contents should not be construed or relied upon as legal advice. Specialist legal advice should always be taken in every case noting that the application of the law may vary according to the individual facts of the case and the nature of the dispute.

The family court is frequently tasked with determining applications under section 8 of the Children Act 1989 (“the Act”).

However, with competing positions, interests and allegations, how is the court to determine, for example, with whom the child should live, or whether one parent should be prevented from taking certain steps they would ordinarily be entitled to take? Such orders naturally and necessarily infringe on the rights a parent would normally enjoy by virtue of their parental responsibility and are therefore serious orders with significant consequences for the child and their parents.

How does the court go about making such important decision? The court normally orders the production of a welfare report under section 7 of the Act, which provides:

“7 Welfare reports.

(1) A court considering any question with respect to a child under this Act may—
(a) ask an officer of the Service or a Welsh family proceedings officer; or
(b) ask a local authority to arrange for—
(i) an officer of the authority; or
(ii) such other person (other than an officer of the Service or a Welsh family proceedings officer) as the authority considers appropriate,
to report to the court on such matters relating to the welfare of that child as are required to be dealt with in the report.”

Frequently, but not exclusively, Cafcass are tasked with producing the report[1]. The role of Cafcass is outlined on their website:

 “We independently advise the family courts about what is safe for children and in their best interests. We focus on their needs, wishes and feelings, making sure that children’s voices are heard and are at the heart of the family court’s thinking and decision making. Our duty is to safeguard and promote the welfare of children going through the family justice system.” [2]

The aim of the section 7 report is to establish what is happening for the subject child, to analyse their situation and, applying the welfare checklist, make recommendations in their best interests. Therefore the advice given by Cafcass in a section 7 report is of central importance to the court in reaching its decision; ultimately they are the independent professionals who give recommendations.

The court therefore rightly places a great amount of reliance on the section 7 report when deciding what orders, if any, to make. This was highlighted by Thorpe LJ in Re W (residence) [1999] 3 FCR 274:

“Judges are hugely dependent upon the contribution that can be made by the welfare officer, who has the opportunity to visit the home and to see the grown-ups and the children in much less artificial circumstances than the judge can ever do.”

However, the section 7 report is not the final word as the court is always the ultimate arbiter of the welfare best interests of any child. In Scott v Scott [1986] 2 FLR 320 Dillon LJ highlighted the point, noting that the role of Cafcass is to:

“…investigate the circumstances of the child or children concerned and all the important figures in their lives, so as to provide the court with reliable factual observations and factual details which will be the base on which a Judge can form his own opinion.” (emphasis added).

Therefore, the question is when can a court depart from the recommendations of a Cafcass officer?

Firstly, the court should have an evidential basis to justify a departure from the recommendations of the section 7 report.  In Re B (Care: Expert Witnesses) [1996] 1 FLR 667, Ward LJ stated:

“The expert advises but the Judge decides. The Judge decides on the evidence. If there is nothing before the court, no facts or no circumstances shown to the court, which throw doubt on the expert evidence, then, if that is all with which the court is left, the court must accept it. There is, however, no rule that the Judge suspends judicial belief simply because the evidence is given by an expert.”

And Butler-Sloss LJ added:

“An expert is not in any special position and there is no presumption of belief in a doctor however distinguished he or she may be. It is, however, necessary for the Judge to give reasons for disagreeing with experts’ conclusions or recommendations. That, this Judge did. A Judge cannot substitute his own views for the views of the experts without some evidence to support what he concludes.” (emphasis added).

Secondly, Butler-Sloss LJ highlights the requirement to give reasons when recommendations are not followed, pursuant to the authorities of W v W (A Minor: Custody Appeal) [1988] 2 FLR 505 and Re W (Residence) [1999] 2 FLR 390, which were subsequently confirmed in Re R (Residence Order) [2010] 1 FLR 509 where Ward LJ stated at paragraph 36:

“Mr Hepher draws our attention to Re W (Residence) [1999] 2 FLR 390 at 395 where Thorpe LJ said:

“… Authority has established clearly, since at least the decision of this Court in W v W (A Minor: Custody Appeal) [1988] 2 FLR 505, 513, that judges are not entitled to depart from the recommendation of an experienced court welfare officer without at least reasoning that departure.”

Thirdly, Re R also deals with the important issue of whether the court is required to explore with the Cafcass Officer in oral evidence any issues they may have with their recommendations and any potential departure they may have in mind.

The decision of the court was not unanimous on the issue with Ward LJ dissenting. Rix LJ and Moore-Bick LJ concluded that, unless there are strong reasons to do otherwise, in a report with clear recommendations that a judge should hear from the Cafcass officer before reaching a different conclusion. This follows the earlier decision of Re A (Children: 1959 UN Declaration) [1998] 1 FLR 354 which “emphasises the importance of the judge testing any misgivings that he may have developed from the written report of the welfare officer in the witness box.”[3]

In Re R Rix LJ stated at paragraph 59:

“Similarly, I consider that the judge has erred in rejecting Dr Cochrane’s conclusions without hearing Dr Cochrane for himself. It is widely recognised in the authorities that this should not happen if it can be avoided. Thus in Re CB (Access: Attendance of Court Welfare Officer) [1995] 1 FLR 622 at 629(CA), Purchas LJ said:

‘In cases where there are clear-cut recommendations and warnings such as those present in the second report, as indeed there were in the first report, in my judgment, it is wrong for a judge to proceed to form conclusions directly contrary to such recommendations without availing himself of the opportunity of receiving further assistance from the court welfare officer in the form of evidence. It is open to the judge to adjourn the case and demand the presence of the court welfare officer. The court welfare officer may vary his opinion in the light of the evidence or in the light of points put to him by the judge or, alternatively, he may hold his opinions. Whichever event occurs, the judge, having availed himself of the opportunity of receiving the further evidence, may then make his decision applying his own discretion. But to apply his discretion without availing himself of that opportunity is, in my judgment, a defective exercise of discretion.’

In Ward LJ’s dissenting judgment on this issue, he interpreted Re CB as recognising that it is a matter of discretion as to whether court needs oral evidence from Cafcass[4]. He also highlighted the practical difficulties of have a Cafcass officer available every time to give oral evidence, referencing the potential delays and “procedural straitjacket”[5] mentioned by Hale J in Re C (Section 8 Order: Court Welfare Officer) [1995] 1 FLR 617.

However, Rix LJ addressed the decision of Re C at paragraph 60:

“In Re C (Section 8 Order: Court Welfare Officer) [1995] 1 FLR 617, the judge upheld the status quo (residence with the mother) in accordance with (and not contrary to) the slight preference of the court welfare officer, but the complaint of the father was that he should not have done so without adjourning to permit the officer to attend. However, the judge had been able to see the teenage boy in question to obtain his own views. This court dismissed the appeal, upholding the judge’s exercise of discretion not to adjourn. Hale J said that where a report was without any firm recommendation in any particular direction, it was unnecessary to adjourn and it would have been open to the judge to conduct his own evaluation of the relevant considerations and to weigh them slightly differently, even in favour of the father, without the presence of the court officer. She added (at 620):

‘Thus the case of Re CB cannot be a hard-and-fast rule of law. Procedural straitjackets in cases of this kind would be most undesirable, especially in the light of the balancing act which is required by the paramount consideration of the child’s welfare and the provisions as to delay in s 1(2). Many factors will have to be taken into account in the exercise of the court’s discretion. These will include how much further assistance the court welfare officer can give, and the extent to which it would be safe and proper to depart from any recommendations made.’

Rix LJ upheld the principle espoused by Hale J in Re CB that in marginal cases, without clear recommendations in either direction, the court is entitled to conduct its own evaluation and reach its own conclusions without hearing from the Cafcass officer. He appears to have concluded that this is not inconsistent with Re CB which requires the court to hear from the Cafcass officer should they look to depart from “clear cut recommendations”. In doing so, Rix LJ highlighted the dichotomy the court must draw between marginal cases and those with firm recommendations in order to determine whether oral evidence from the Cafcass officer should be called upon before departing from the recommendations.

The authorities recognise that there is not an absolute rule when it comes to hearing oral evidence from a Cafcass Officer (or not) when considering making an order contrary to their recommendations. It seems the firmer the recommendation and the more significant the departure, the greater the need becomes for the court to hear oral evidence from the Cafcass officer.

Conclusion

It remains unusual for the views of Cafcass to be significantly departed from. It is notable that all of these cases were decided a number of years ago. It is a settled legal position.

The court therefore must (and clearly should) place a large amount of reliance on the recommendations of Cafcass in coming to decisions in cases. It is open to the court in these cases to come to a different conclusion, provided that the reason for the departure can be clearly explained, based on evidence and realistically having heard evidence on the point to test any misgivings about the section 7 report.

[1] Alternatively it may be a social worker employed by the local authority. However, for the purposes and remainder of this article I will refer only to Cafcass or a Cafcass Family Court Advisor).

[2] Cafcass website as of September 2025

[3] Thorpe LJ in Re W (Residence) [1999] 2 FLR 390 at 395

[4] Paragraph 40

[5] Paragraph 41

HHJ Evans sitting at the Manchester County Court dismissed an appeal against a Civil Penalty Notice in the amount of £40,000 issued to an employer following a data sharing from HMRC.  As a first breach, the maximum penalty was £45,000 which was reduced to £40,000 in line with the Code of Practice.

The employee was somebody who had entered the UK as a dependent and then overstayed.  Although the employer appealed on the principle basis that it was not liable for a penalty or in the alternative had a statutory excuse, in the course of argument at the hearing it accepted that as a result of employing someone who did not have the right to work, it was liable and because it did not carry out the prescribed checks, could not rely on the statutory excuse.  The only issue left was whether the penalty amount was too high.

Tony Muman was instructed for the Secretary of State to defend the appeal.

HHJ Evans rejected the employer’s claim that the Secretary of State had failed to exercise her discretion properly.  The learned judge found that not only was the Secretary of State entitled to exercise her discretion to issue the penalty, but that she was right to do so.  HHJ Evans rejected the submission that the Secretary of State acted unreasonably, finding that the law is absolutely clear and the process by which checks are to be carried out specified in the statute and statutory instruments.  The learned judge agreed with the employer that £40,000 was a large amount of money, especially for an employer who up until that point was of good character.  But, that  is the figure that the Secretary of State and Parliament has chosen to set the starting point at, noting that it was now significantly higher than it used to be.  The employer was also ordered to pay the Secretary of State’s costs.

Tony Muman is an expert in civil penalty cases and was instructed by Lauren Pritchard at Keoghs Solicitors.

For any booking enquiries, please contact the civil clerk at civil@halcyonchambers.com

HHJ Marquand, sitting at the Wandsworth County Court, dismissed an appeal against a Civil Penalty Notice, in the total amount of £90,000 issued to a sole trader following an unannounced immigration visit to the business premises, a garage in South London.  As a first breach, the maximum penalty was £45,000 per worker.  Two men were found working at the garage when the Home Office visited.

On appeal, the employer claimed that one of the men was his brother and that he was not working but simply visiting. The employer admitted that the second man was working but claimed that he was there working for another business operating from the same garage.

Tony Muman was instructed for the Secretary of State to defend the appeal.

Following trial, HHJ Marquand rejected the employer’s claim and found that the two men were employed under a contract of service and endorsed the civil penalty. He also ordered the employer to pay the Secretary of State’s costs.

Invalid appeal?

The legislative scheme works in the following way:

A Civil Penalty Notice is issued under s.  15(2) of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006. It must be in prescribed form: s. 15(6).

Section 16 applies where an employer to whom a penalty notice is given objects on grounds including that he is not liable to the imposition of a penalty. This is referred to a notice of objection: s. 16(2). A Civil Penalty is usually accompanied by a proforma form for an objection to be made. The objection does not, however, have to be made using the form but must be given in the prescribed manner: s. 16(3)(c). Provided all the information that is required to be given, is given; an employer can object by simply writing to the Home Office. It is sensible to ensure that the objection is signed (‘I confirm that the above information is correct to the best of my knowledge’).

Under s. 17(1), an employer to whom a penalty notice is given may appeal to the County Court. It is important to remember that the decision giving rise to the appeal is the penalty notice, and not the objection outcome notice. The latter is unappealable; the former is appealable.

An appeal is commenced by completing an Appellant’s Notice (Form N161), which must identify the correct date of the decision being appealed.

The appeal is a rehearing of the Secretary of State’s decision to impose a civil penalty. It is not a rehearing of the objection outcome notice.

The Secretary of State is then required to determine the objection: s. 16(4). She can cancel the penalty, reduce the penalty, increase the penalty, or decide to take no action (i.e., to maintain the penalty).

Under s. 17(4A), an appeal against the penalty notice may only be brought if the employer has given a notice of objection under section 16 and the Secretary of State has determined the objection.

Under s. 17(4B), an appeal must be brought within the period of 28 days beginning with the relevant date.  The relevant date is the date specified in the objection outcome notice issued in accordance with s. 16(5)(b) as the date on which it was given: s. 17(4D).  This date is important. It is a statutory time limit and one that Parliament has decided cannot be extended.

In this case, the employer filed the N161 within the 28-day limitation period, and it was issued by the court.

Under section 2 of the N161, the date of the decision appealed was said to be 5 March 2025. This was, in fact, the date of the objection outcome notice. There is no statutory right to appeal the objection outcome notice. Parliament has crafted a scheme allowing for the appeal against the penalty notice only: s.17(1).

This omission, which may have been fatal, was perhaps saved by section 5 of the N161, which confirmed that the appeal was against the civil penalty notice.

Section 6 of the N161 confirmed that the grounds of appeal were attached. Section 7 of N161, which relates to skeleton arguments, was left blank.

Section 9 of the N161, dealing with the order sought from the County Court, was completed.

Section 10 of the N161 deals with ‘other applications’.

Section 11 of the N161 is for reasons and evidence in support of any section 10 application. Both sections are mutual. In this appeal, because there was no application sought, sections 10 and 11 were left blank.

The form then proceeds to require a signature underneath a Statement of Truth. In express terms, the Statement of Truth must be completed in support of the evidence in section 11. Absent a section 10 application, the need for a section 11 Statement of Truth is redundant.

In this appeal, despite not making a section 10 application, the employer signed and dated the Statement of Truth.

Section 14 of the N161 is the operative part for an appellant’s signature. By signing the form at section 14, an appellant confirms that the form is complete and is no longer a draft. It is an important final procedural step in any appeal. The failure to sign the form is a serious omission.

In this appeal, section 14 was not signed. What appears to have happened is that the employer signed the Statement of Truth in the mistaken belief that this was the signature required by the form.

In Nathadwarawala v General Medical Council [2025] EWHC 459 (Admin), the GMC raised a jurisdictional objection to an appeal on grounds that the appeal had not been brought within the statutory 28-day period for appealing to the High Court. Whilst the N161 had been submitted and the fee paid a few days before the 28-day period expired, it was not signed, and the signature box was blank. The appellant sought to correct his mistake reasonably promptly after the error was pointed out to him by the court’s administrative staff, but by then the 28-day appeal period had already elapsed. The GMC argued that the court did not have the power to extend the time for bringing the appeal.

The High Court decided that (1) the appellant’s submission to the Administrative Court Office of an unsigned N161 did not suffice to constitute the bringing of an appeal within the 28-day period; (2) the absence of a signature was a serious omission, and (3) in the circumstances, the court had no power either to treat the appeal as having been brought within time or to extend time. As such, the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the late-filed appeal, which fell to be dismissed regardless of its substantive merits.

In General Medical Council v Konathala [2025] EWHC 1550 (Admin), the N161 was filed on behalf of the GMC with sections 1 to 13 fully completed, including a signed and dated Statement of Truth prior to the expiry of the 28-day appeal period. The GMC had failed to sign the signature box at Section 14 of the N161 and made no attempts to correct this failure at any stage. Despite the lack of signature, the GMC’s N161 was sealed by the court office within the 28days. Following this, a hearing date was fixed, and hearing bundles and skeleton arguments were filed by both parties. During these procedural stages of the appeal, neither the court nor the parties raised the fact that section 14 of the N161 had not been signed.

Having realised the error, the respondent argued that, in line with Nathadwarawala, the lack of a signature meant that the GMC’s appeal was invalid and that the court had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The GMC submitted that the factual position was vastly different to that in Nathadwarawala. The N161 was signed by the GMC solicitor, albeit at the statement of truth section, whereas in Nathadwarawala, there was no signature anywhere on the form. Therefore, the statement of truth signature was sufficient to indicate that the N161 was complete, as demonstrated by the fact that the court office issued the appeal.

The High Court held that because the court office had issued the GMC’s N161, the appeal proceedings had begun in accordance with CPR.r.7.2, and as such the court could, on application, exercise its discretion under CPR.r.3.10 to remedy the GMC’s omission to sign the box in section 14 of the form.

There appears to be some tension between the two decisions. In the end, given his findings on the substantive issue, the Secretary of State did not press HHJ Marquand to rule on validity as a preliminary issue and the point remains live for another case.

Tony Muman is an expert in civil penalty cases.  For any booking enquiries, please contact the civil clerk at civil@halcyonchambers.com

The views stated in this article belong to the writer and no warranty is given, express or implied, in respect of the accuracy of the contents of this article. Nothing in this article is tendered as or is intended to be legal advice and the contents should not be construed or relied upon as legal advice. Specialist legal advice should always be taken in every case, noting that the application of the law may vary according to the individual facts of the case and the nature of the dispute.

Sonya Kalyan recently secured a significant victory before the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber), successfully representing two Iraqi Kurdish brothers in linked asylum appeals. The case was both factually and legally complex, involving deeply rooted family, tribal, and political dynamics in the Kurdish region of Iraq. The outcome underscores the value of strategic case management, rigorous preparation, and fearless advocacy in crucial immigration litigation.

Due to the sensitive nature of the appeals, anonymity orders were granted to protect the appellants’ identities. Their names remain withheld in this article in accordance with Tribunal procedure and to ensure their safety.

Background and Factual Matrix

The brothers appealed refusals of their asylum claims, each grounded in a well-founded fear of persecution. Their fears stemmed from a longstanding family debt and a broken marriage arrangement with MB, a powerful figure affiliated with the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP). They also feared forced military recruitment and violent reprisals from MS, a senior official associated with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).

While the Home Office accepted their nationality and ethnicity, it disputed whether the brothers faced a personal risk, raising concerns about credibility and arguing that state protection or internal relocation were viable alternatives.

Legal Framework

The appeals were determined under the Refugee Convention, as it stood prior to the implementation of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. The Convention protects individuals who are outside their country of nationality and unable or unwilling to return due to a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership of a Particular Social Group. The applicable standard of proof, “a reasonable degree of likelihood” is lower than the criminal threshold but still demands consistency and credibility. See MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216.

Strategic Use of Linked Appeals

Recognising that both claims arose from the same factual matrix, Sonya represented the brothers in linked appeals, ensuring a coherent and unified approach. With no conflict of interest, she was able to advocate vigorously for both clients throughout the proceedings. Linking the appeals allowed for consistent findings, reinforced credibility, and avoided duplication of evidence.

The case demanded meticulous fact-finding and careful handling of sensitive material, including detailed witness statements and live testimony delivered through Kurdish Sorani interpreters. Sonya maintained a clear focus on presenting a credible and consistent narrative, supported by extensive country guidance and legal authority.

Particular Social Group (PSG) and blood feud risk

The Tribunal relied on the Country Policy and Information Note: Iraq – Blood feuds, honour crimes and tribal violence (July 2024), which confirms that individuals caught in blood feuds may constitute a PSG.

Drawing on the authority of EH (Blood Feuds) Albania [2012] UKUT 348 (IAC), the Tribunal found that the brothers, as members of a Kurdish family embroiled in a violent dispute with Barzani and later Sangawi, clearly fell within such a group. The risk of targeted harm was real and ongoing.

State Protection and Internal Relocation

In assessing whether the Iraqi and Kurdistan Regional authorities could offer effective protection, the Tribunal applied the principles from Horvath [2000] UKHL 37. The evidence, including findings in SMO & KSP (Civil Status Documentation; Article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 110 (IAC), demonstrated that law enforcement in the region often avoids tribal disputes, sometimes takes sides, and operates within a system where corruption is rife. The Judge accepted that MS’s influence over the Kurdistan Regional Government rendered any approach to the authorities futile.

Internal relocation was also deemed unreasonable. The brothers spoke only Kurdish and had no connections in Arabic-speaking areas such as Baghdad. Moreover, the pervasive tribal influence and cooperation between the Iraqi and Kurdistan Regional governments meant there was no part of the country where they could genuinely be safe.

Advocacy in a complex legal context

Sonya’s advocacy was instrumental in navigating the legal and evidential complexities of the case. She addressed the Home Office’s challenges to credibility with precision, offering clear and persuasive explanations for any discrepancies, including those relating to financial figures and timelines. Her submissions demonstrated that the brothers’ membership of a PSG exposed them to blood feud violence, and that neither state protection nor internal relocation could mitigate the risk.

Sonya relied on up-to-date country guidance and relevant case law to substantiate the claims, ensuring that the Tribunal fully appreciated the lived realities and nuanced threats faced by the appellants.

Tribunal’s findings on credibility

The Tribunal made unusually strong credibility findings in favour of the brothers. It found them to be honest and reliable witnesses, whose accounts were internally consistent, inherently plausible, and supported by country evidence.

The Judge accepted their account in full, including their father’s debt to Barzani, the arranged marriages of their sisters to settle the debt, their decision to renege on that agreement and flee, their temporary refuge with MS, his coercion to join the peshmerga, and the death threats they received upon leaving. These events were corroborated by general country evidence on blood feuds, tribal honour disputes, and the political influence wielded by MS.

Although the brothers had not claimed asylum en-route to the UK, the Judge accepted their explanation and concluded that this did not undermine the core of their account.

Determination and legal outcome

Having considered all aspects of the case, the Tribunal concluded that both brothers had a genuine and well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. It found that they could not obtain protection from the Iraqi or Kurdistan Regional authorities, and that internal relocation was not a viable option. Their removal would breach the UK’s obligations under the Refugee Convention and Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In the alternative, removal would also breach Article 8 ECHR due to the very significant obstacles to reintegration.

Conclusion

This case illustrates the importance of comprehensive case management and fearless representation in asylum claims involving intersecting political, social, and familial complexities. Sonya’s approach, grounded in legal precision, cultural sensitivity, and strategic advocacy, was central to the successful outcome.

Sonya continues to accept instructions in complex immigration and asylum matters, including those involving linked appeals and challenging country contexts.

To instruct Sonya, please contact the chambers’ immigration clerk at immigration@halcyonchambers.com.

The views stated in this article belong to the writers in a personal capacity.  No warranty is given, express or implied, in respect of the contents of this article.  Nothing in this article is tendered as or is intended to be taken as legal advice and the contents should not be construed or relied upon as legal advice.  Specialist legal advice should always be taken in every case noting that the application of the law may vary according to the individual facts of the case and the nature of the dispute. 

Halcyon Chambers is delighted to announce that Paige Procter-Harris has accepted an offer of tenancy.

This comes after successful completion of pupillage under the supervision of Suzanne Hodgkiss and Inderjit Thind.

During her Pupillage year, Paige gained experience in Chambers’ core specialist areas including Civil and Family Law. Paige has proved incredibly popular with our Instructing Solicitors and already has experience of work above the level of her Call.

Everyone at Halcyon Chambers welcomes Paige as a Member of Chambers and we look forward to seeing her career grow over the coming years.

Any enquiries in relation to the availability of Paige should be directed to the Clerks.

Miss Gonzalez-Jaspe recently represented an applicant Father in the third set of s.8 Children Act proceedings where allegations of domestic abuse, including abuse of two children, were made against him.

An unusual feature of this case is that the respondent Mother’s principal allegation of physical abuse was not only in respect of a non-subject child (NSC) but was in respect of an alleged incident of which the Mother had no direct knowledge and could not, therefore, give direct evidence about. By the time the court had considered the allegations at a fact-finding hearing, the Father had been under police investigation for this allegation for some two years.

In the first set of proceedings, the Mother had alleged (inter alia) that the Father was coercive and controlling throughout, and since, their relationship. Following a fact-finding hearing in those proceedings, the Court found the allegations against the Father not proven. This allegation was being reconsidered by the Court following the decision in H-N [2021] EWCA Civ 448 which now requires the Court to focus on the wider context of whether there has been a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour, as opposed to a list of specific factual incidents that are tied to a particular date and time, since abusive, coercive and controlling behaviour is likely to have a cumulative impact upon its victims which would not be identified simply by separate and isolated consideration of individual incidents.

In the second set of proceedings, the Mother alleged that the Father had acted inappropriately toward the subject child. She then withdrew that allegation but raised it as a continuing concern within these proceedings.

Evidence was heard over three days. Due to the Court not hearing evidence from the NSC or their mother, Miss Gonzalez-Jaspe made lengthy submissions in respect of the principal allegation which required a detailed analysis of the police and medical disclosure, multiple witness statements from the NSC’s mother, ABE interview of the NSC and police interview of the Father as well as various audio and video footage.

Miss Gonzalez-Jaspe was successful in persuading the court that the principal allegation, as alleged, was not proven. Further, the allegation of inappropriate behaviour toward the subject child, and the allegation of coercive and controlling behaviour toward the Mother were also not proven on the balance of probabilities.

Miss Gonzalez-Jaspe frequently represents parties in cases that involve serious allegations of domestic abuse and abuse toward children. She takes a sensitive but robust approach to her advocacy and client management in such matters.