Microsoft Outage

 

Everyone at Halcyon Chambers has been affected by the Microsoft outage.

If anyone has sent us an email after 6pm last night (Thursday 12 November), please note we may not have received this. We kindly ask that if there is anything urgent in relation to hearings listed today or on Monday, please call us.

If you have an enquiry, we can still access our diary, so please contact us on the number below.

Our contact number is 0121 237 6035.

 

 

Tony Muman Secures Protection Appeal Victory for Vulnerable Appellant

Tony Muman

Tony Muman of Halcyon Chambers has successfully represented a vulnerable appellant before the First-tier Tribunal in an appeal concerning the risk of serious harm from illegal moneylenders, securing the appeal on Humanitarian Protection and Article 3 ECHR grounds.

The appeal concerned a national of Vietnam who had become indebted to illegal moneylenders and was subsequently subjected to threats, violence and intimidation as part of efforts to recover the debt.

Following her departure from Vietnam, the appellant travelled through China and France. It was accepted by the Home Office that she had been trafficked and sexually exploited in France before escaping and ultimately travelling to the United Kingdom. Her trafficking history and resulting vulnerability were important features of the case.

Significant aspects of the appellant’s account had been accepted by the Home Office. The principal issues before the Tribunal were whether those pursuing the debt retained a continuing interest in locating and pursuing her, whether sufficient state protection would be available and whether she could safely and reasonably relocate elsewhere in Vietnam.

The Appeal
The appeal involved a substantial body of documentary and country evidence. This included the loan agreement, medical and photographic evidence, police summonses, witness evidence, video footage and material demonstrating continuing attempts to locate the appellant.

Of particular significance were “wanted” posters publicly identifying the appellant and her former husband as individuals with respect to the debt who had absconded from repayment of the debt. The Tribunal accepted that these provided evidence of active attempts to locate and place pressure upon them.

The Judge also placed significant weight on video footage showing men attending a family property and aggressively demanding repayment from a woman said to be the appellant’s mother, with threats being made in the course of the encounter. The Tribunal found that the footage provided strong corroboration that the lenders remained actively interested in recovering the debt and continued to harass the appellant’s family years after she had left Vietnam.

The Tribunal accepted that the appellant had been subjected to violence and intimidation as part of efforts to recover the debt, and that her family continued to experience threats and harassment because the debt remained outstanding.

The evidence was also consistent with methods employed by illegal moneylenders, including public shaming, exposure and the harassment of family members as forms of coercion. The Tribunal accepted that information concerning the appellant and the debt had been publicised both physically and electronically, including through wanted posters and social media exposure, in an effort to locate her and secure repayment.

State Protection and Internal Relocation
Although Vietnam has measures in place to combat illegal moneylending, the Tribunal found that effective protection would not be available to this appellant. Importantly, the Judge accepted her evidence that she had previously sought assistance from the authorities but had received no meaningful support.

Internal relocation was also rejected. The lenders had demonstrated a sustained determination to locate the appellant, had targeted members of her family and had continued pursuing repayment over a number of years. The debt remains outstanding, providing a continuing reason for the lenders to pursue her.

The country evidence further recognised that some illegal moneylenders may possess regional or national reach and may continue pursuing debtors beyond their original locality. The Tribunal found that this was a case involving a continuing and persistent adverse interest, rather than a localised dispute which would simply disappear if the appellant moved elsewhere.

The Tribunal also noted that internal movement within Vietnam is not entirely anonymous, this increased the risk that the appellant could ultimately be traced.

Her accepted trafficking history, vulnerability as a woman returning alone, outstanding debt, social media exposure and the continuing efforts to trace her were also material considerations.

The Tribunal found that there remained a real risk that the appellant would be located and subjected to serious harm in the proposed area of relocation. It further found that, having regard to her individual circumstances, it would not be reasonable to expect her to relocate internally and that internal relocation was therefore not available to her.

Taking the evidence cumulatively, the Tribunal concluded that the appellant remained at a real risk of serious harm/ill-treatment on return, that there would not be sufficient state protection and that internal relocation was not a viable option.

The appeal was therefore allowed on Humanitarian Protection grounds and, alternatively, under Article 3 ECHR.

Tony Muman heads Halcyon Chambers’ Immigration and Public Law team.

For instructions or further information regarding Tony Muman’s immigration and asylum practice, please contact the clerks at Halcyon Chambers.

Chambers Welcomes New Pupil Barristers



We are delighted to announce that Rachael FitzGerald-Finch and Kamran Mohammad have joined Halcyon Chambers as our new Pupils.

Both Rachael and Kamran will commence their mixed Common Law Pupillage from 1 October 2026 under the supervision of Katie Wilkinson and Tony Muman respectively.

Please join us in welcoming both Rachael and Kamran to Halcyon Chambers and we wish them every success.

URGENT: Telephone Lines



Unfortunately, we are experiencing some technical issues our end, and our main phone line (0121 237 6035) is down.

It seems this may be affecting some of our direct numbers also.

Please contact the clerks on our alternative number of 0121 728 0573.

Government Consultation on Legal Rights for Cohabitees

Article by Harry Owen

On Friday 05 June 2026, the government launched its consultation on reforms potentially offering cohabiting couples – who have cohabitated for over 3 years or who have a child together – greater financial protections when relationships end.  This includes the prospect of automatic inheritance rights when a partner dies intestate.

The government has announced proposals designed to modernise family law and to take account of modern family structures. The proposals, which the government has described as “the biggest reform to family law in decades” with the intention of “bringing the law into the 21st century”, would offer greater safeguards to victims of abusive domestic relationships and make both pre-nuptial and post-nuptial agreements legally binding.

Announcing the consultation, Justice Secretary David Lammy said:

“When a relationship comes to an end, each partner should have the support and certainty they need to rebuild their life. We’re launching this consultation to make sure our new family law builds a fair system that offers the most vulnerable protection in the event of a breakup, and at a time where the country is facing cost of living pressures.”

“Whether you’ve been left bereaved by the sudden and unexpected death of a partner, or escaped horrific domestic abuse, our laws should work to protect you. These reforms strike an important balance between tradition and modernity.  I’m determined that our justice system should work for everyone who needs it.”

There has been support for the proposals with declining marriage rates and the fact that 51.3% of children are born to unmarried parents (with around 90% of children born to cohabiting couples) being cited as clear evidence that the system needs urgent reform.

A 2025 YouGov survey found that 55% of those surveyed approved of pre-nuptial and post nuptial agreements, with 60% approving of such agreements being automatically upheld on divorce.  Further it has been suggested that such changes in law would give couples greater security and certainty when a marriage ends and at the same time significantly reducing the overwhelming number of cases going through the court system.

The Law Society of England and Wales has offered cautious support for the proposals, but has noted the need to ensure that any proposals being brought into law would require the provision of sufficient resources to make any meaningful difference., stating that:

“The Law Society of England and Wales welcomes and will respond to this long-awaited consultation. For too long, millions of people in cohabiting relationships have not had basic financial protections, which is a particular problem if one of them dies or if there is domestic abuse. Updating the law to reflect modern relationships is vital. However, rights are only meaningful if we can all actually access and enforce them. Without legal aid and adequate court resource, these new protections may only exist on paper.”

The consultation seeks further feedback on proposals to strengthen the protections for cohabiting couples, where one partner dies intestate. The reception from lawyers for these proposals has been cooler than the proposal set out above.

The issues surrounding intestacy rights (for example tax benefits and inheritance tax) have been cited as a complication that would need careful and detailed consideration, to avoid creating a whole new set of complications. Others have expressed concern that there may be large numbers of people who hear the news of these proposals and take the mistaken view that they are now protected automatically and need to take no action to protect their position.  Many have stressed that with the wide range of differing and complex family arrangements that exist in modern society, it is all but impossible for there to be a satisfactory set of rules that adequately deals with every modern family.

As with any proposal for a change in the law, nothing can remove the need for careful and considered estate planning. It is simply unrealistic to expect that any set of rules can account for all the uniquely blended families and the specific provisions that any individual may want in place for their loved ones, upon their death. Indeed, automatic inheritance rights are ever likely to produce outcomes that are contrary to those provisions.

The complexities of defining cohabitation have also given cause for concern. There are questions to be answered before the government proposals could be enacted. How exactly is cohabitation defined? When does cohabitation begin? How are relationships that have been ‘on again off again’ over a number of years to be considered? How are couples with separate finances to be considered?

Ultimately, those practicing in the wills and probate field, while welcoming the discussion regarding legal reform for cohabiting couples, seem unavoidably, and quite correctly drawn to the conclusion that whatever may be enacted in the future, the safest and most appropriate approach to estate planning is a carefully considered and professionally drafted will.

Permission is now required to appeal decisions of Lay Justices: is this a sensible reform or an unwelcome impediment?

Article by Emma-Justine Michaux

By way of context, Lay Justices are volunteers with no legal background who make binding decisions in both private and public family law cases. As they are not legally qualified, they are advised on matters of law and procedure by legal advisers.

This setting is similar to that of a judge giving legal directions to a jury in a criminal trial. However, legal advisers are not required to follow the stringent rules that apply to judges when summarising the facts of a case and giving clear and concise directions to magistrates, nor do they possess the same level of experience and qualification as judges.

In light of these circumstances, there was previously an automatic right of appeal against a decision made by Lay Justices, without the need to obtain permission.

Following the Family Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2025, changes have been made and, since 2 March 2026, permission to appeal is required in order to challenge a decision made by a bench of Lay Justices. An application for permission must be made by way of an appeal notice to the appeal court, meaning a judge of a higher level within the Family Court rather than the court below. Permission to appeal will therefore not be determined by a bench of Lay Justices.

The Explanatory Memorandum to the Family Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2025 sets out the following reasons for this change:

  • It would provide consistency across the family courts by requiring permission to appeal regardless of the level of judge whose decision is being challenged;
  • There is an increasing volume of private family law work undertaken by Lay Justices, and the change has the potential to reduce unmeritorious appeals and conserve court resources.

Although the majority of designated family judges were supportive of this change, some consultees raised concerns regarding the absence of statistical evidence demonstrating a widespread issue, the adequacy of existing case management powers, and the implications for the training and support of Lay Justices and their advisers.

The burden is now on appellants to demonstrate either that their appeal has a real prospect of success or that there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard.

Another Home Office win for Counsel Tony Muman

 

Tony Muman

Counsel Tony Muman appeared on behalf of the Secretary of State for the Home Department in a Civil Penalties appeal today in Newcastle-Upon-Tyne.

The case concerned the question of whether the worker had the right to work in a supplementary employment role with a second employer and also for the type of work he was doing. In part, the issue turned on the intricacies of being a chef versus being a cook.

In dismissing the appeal, His Honour Judge Thomas observed that it is right that the civil penalty was punitive in nature, that the Home Office was right to issue one in these circumstances, and that the Home Office were right to set it at £40,000 in part for a wider deterrent message to be sent. HHJ Thomas also ordered the Employer to pay the Home Office costs in full.

Tony Muman acted for the Home Office instructed by Danielle Cavannagh and the excellent team at Keoghs Solicitors. Tony is an expert in civil penalty cases and acts for both Home Office and Employers.

Civil, Employment and Immigration Barrister Oliver Dixon joins Halcyon Chambers as an Associate Member

 

Halcyon Chambers are delighted to announce that Oliver Dixon has joined Chambers as an Associate Member.

Called to the Bar in 2021, Oliver accepts instructions in Civil, Commercial, Employment, and Immigration Law.

To instruct Oliver, please contact the clerks at the respective email addresses (civil@halcyonchambers.com and immigration@halcyonchambers.com) or on 0121 237 6035

Vehicle Control Services Ltd v Langley [2026] EWCC 1 – Supervision and Assisting in the Conduct of Litigation

Article by Emma-Justine Michaux

The County Court judgment in Vehicle Control Services Ltd v Langley [2026] EWCC 1 squarely confronts an issue that has been bubbling under the surface of civil litigation for years: whether non-qualified advocates, commonly referred to as “solicitor agents”, are entitled to appear in court without their client present. Although not binding, the decision has the potential to cause serious disruption to a business model relied upon daily in courts across England and Wales.

Solicitor agents are non-qualified legal professionals typically contracted on a case-by-case basis by advocacy agencies, rather than being employed by the solicitors with conduct of the litigation. That was precisely the arrangement in Langley.  The judgment makes clear, however, that “solicitor agent” is a misleading description. It is not a term recognised by the Legal Services Act 2007 and wrongly suggests an authority that does not exist. The correct legal question is whether the individual is an “Exempt Person” under Schedule 3 of the Act, which alone can confer a right of audience on an unqualified individual.

The recent decision in Mazur v Charles Russell Speechlys [2025] EWHC 2341 triggered understandable concern among non-qualified legal professionals. However, the court in Langley was clear that this panic was misplaced. Mazurconcerned who may conduct litigation, not who may exercise rights of audience. Those are distinct reserved legal activities under the Act, and Mazur said nothing about advocacy.

This judgment, by contrast, addresses advocacy head-on. Relying on Schedule 3 of the Legal Services Act 2007, the court held that four cumulative conditions must be satisfied for an individual to qualify as an Exempt Person with a right of audience:

  • the individual must be assisting in the conduct of litigation;
  • they must be acting under the instructions and supervision of an authorised litigator;
  • the proceedings must be heard “in chambers”; and
  • the proceedings must not be reserved family proceedings.

The court stressed that advocacy alone cannot amount to “assisting in the conduct of litigation”, which is defined as issuing, prosecuting or defending proceedings and performing ancillary functions such as signing statements of truth.

The judgment also confirms that non-qualified advocates are not excluded altogether. In small claims proceedings, a lay representative may address the court provided the party themselves attends, under CPR PD27A and the Lay Representatives (Rights of Audience) Order 1999.

On the facts, the advocate in this case could not meet the exemption test. Neither he nor the advocacy agency had taken any steps in the litigation. The solicitor with conduct of the claim was not supervising or instructing him directly; instead, instructions passed through multiple contractual layers. This fell far short of the traditional model Parliament intended to preserve, namely in-house managing clerks or equivalent individuals working closely under a solicitor’s supervision. Although the hearing could arguably be characterised as one historically heard in chambers, that factor alone was insufficient.

The implications are stark. Advocacy-only agencies routinely attend vast numbers of hearings without clients present. While this decision is not binding, if adopted by a higher court it would place that entire model under acute pressure, with immediate and far-reaching practical consequences for civil litigation practice.

Tony Muman successfully defends Home Office in £40,000 illegal worker fine

 

Tony MumanIn a ruling yesterday, HHJ Ralton sitting at the County Court in Bristol dismissed the Employer’s appeal against a £40,000 Civil Penalty Notice, rejecting claims that the Employer had not employed an illegal worker or that the amount of the penalty was too high.  HHJ Ralton agreed wholly with Tony Muman’s submission and stated that it was quite extraordinary how the Employer presented a different case under cross-examination to the case presented to the Home Office and to the Court all the way.  He agreed with Tony Muman’s submission that the Employer had made up oral evidence to explain the illegal worker’s presence at the business premises.  HHJ Ralton also ordered the Employer to pay the Home Office costs in full.

Tony Muman acted for the Home Office instructed by Lauren Pritchard and the excellent team at Keoghs Solicitors.  Tony is an expert in civil penalty cases and acts for both Home Office and Employers.

Muhammad Ul-Haq shortlisted for Barrister of the Year (over 10 years’ Call)

 

We are delighted to announce that Muhammad Ul-Haq has been shortlisted for Barrister of the Year (over 10 years’ Call) for the Birmingham Law Society Legal Awards in 2026.

This in addition to Muhammad being ranked in both Chambers and Partners and Legal 500 this year for the first time.

Halcyon Chambers wishes to congratulate everyone who has been shortlisted in their respective categories the best of luck.

Coming Home for Christmas?

 

Tony MumanTony Muman, led by Manjit Gill KC (instructed by J M Wilson Solicitors), succeeds in very important case on the Home Secretary’s power to stop an airline passenger from boarding a flight for reasons unconnected to terrorism.

The facts of this case are extraordinary.  Following a hard fought victory, the High Court ordered the Home Secretary to bring FD back to the UK at her cost and before Wed 17th December – at which point his Turkish visa expires.

The press summary is here. The judgment is here.

A full in-depth analysis to follow.

The SSHD has indicated that she will be appealing to the Court of Appeal on an expedited basis, which may lead to the Court of Appeal having to convene to hear the application before the end of term this week.

This is a fast moving case…

Construction Firm Wins Appeal Against £45,000 Home Office Civil Penalty for Employing Alleged Illegal Worker

 

Tony Muman leading Muhammad Ul-Haq ​represented the employer

In a significant ruling at the Birmingham County Court, an employer successfully appealed against a £45,000 civil penalty imposed by the Home Office.  The penalty was issued for allegedly employing an individual, who was deemed to have lost his right to work due to an implicit withdrawal of his asylum application.  ​

Background

The case revolved around whether the construction firm had conducted proper checks to verify the employee’s right to work. ​ The employee, an asylum seeker, had been granted permission to work in the UK under specific conditions. ​ The firm argued that it had carried out all necessary checks, including verifying his Application Registration Card (ARC) and using the Home Office’s share code system, which confirmed his eligibility to work for 20 hours per week. ​ However, the Home Office later claimed that the employee’s right to work had ceased, due to non-compliance with asylum procedures. ​

Key Issues

The appeal focused on three grounds:

  1. Liability for the Penalty: The firm argued it was not liable as it had conducted the prescribed checks and reasonably believed the employee had the right to work. ​
  2. Statutory Excuse: The firm claimed it was excused from the penalty under Section 15(3) of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, as it had complied with prescribed requirements.
  3. Penalty Amount: The firm contended the £45,000 penalty was disproportionate and would force the company into liquidation. ​

Court Findings

Her Honour Judge Truman at the County Court in Birmingham ruled in favour of the appellant, concluding that:

  • The firm had conducted the required checks, including obtaining a Positive Verification Notice (PVN) from the Home Office Employer Checking Service, even though it could not produce a copy of the PVN during the appeal. ​
  • The lack of a PVN copy did not negate the firm’s compliance with the prescribed requirements under the law. ​
  • The penalty was disproportionate given the firm’s financial position and the circumstances of the case. ​ The judge noted that the firm had acted in good faith, openly documented the employee’s employment, and paid taxes and national insurance.

Outcome

The court allowed the appeal and cancelled the £45,000 penalty, citing the firm’s compliance with legal requirements and the disproportionality of the penalty.  HHJ Truman emphasised the importance of fairness and proportionality in such cases, noting that the penalty should reflect the gravity of the breach. ​ If the firm had failed to meet the statutory excuse, the judge indicated a reduced penalty of £5,000 would have been more appropriate. ​

Implications

This ruling highlights the importance of employers conducting diligent checks on employees’ right to work and retaining proper documentation. ​ It also underscores the need for proportionality in penalties, especially for small businesses that may face severe financial consequences from high fines. ​ The case illustrates helpful principles for future appeals against civil penalties imposed under the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006.

Tony Muman is an expert in civil penalty cases and together with Muhammad Ul-Haq was instructed under direct access.

For any booking enquiries, please contact the civil clerk at civil@halcyonchambers.com

Asylum appeal allowed on grounds of gender-based and political persecution in Sierra Leone

 

In a recent success before the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber), Sonya Kalyan, instructed by J M Wilson Solicitors, secured the allowing of an asylum and human rights appeal for a Sierra Leonean national who had fled sustained threats, abuse, and persecution linked to both gender-based violence and imputed political opinion.

The Tribunal, presided over by a First-tier Tribunal Judge (“FTTJ”), allowed the appeal on asylum, Article 3, and Article 8 ECHR grounds, finding the appellant to be a credible witness who faced a real risk of persecution and serious harm on return to Sierra Leone.

Background and Context

The appellant’s claim centred on two interlinked narratives: her exposure to gender-based abuse and victimisation as a woman activist in Sierra Leone, and her risk arising from her association with her father, a long-standing political critic of the Sierra Leonean government residing in the United States.

Educated to university level, the appellant had engaged in campaigns promoting women’s rights and tackling sexual harassment in professional settings. She used the platform of a national beauty pageant to raise awareness of gender inequality; an event which later attracted political controversy when her father publicly accused the government of tribal bias and corruption in the selection process. His social media broadcasts, viewed widely within Sierra Leone and the diaspora, directly identified her by name.

Following these events, the appellant was subjected to sustained online abuse, threats, and harassment, forcing her into hiding. In the aftermath, her mother was targeted by unknown men believed to be linked to state authorities and later died in custody under suspicious circumstances.

Having entered the UK lawfully as a student, the appellant’s situation worsened when a former partner circulated intimate images of her online without consent; an experience which led to profound psychological trauma and reinforced her sense of exposure and danger.

The Home Office accepted the appellant’s identity and her father’s political profile but rejected her account as lacking credibility, alleging inconsistency and insufficient corroboration. It contended that she would not face persecution on return and could safely relocate within Sierra Leone.

Legal Framework

The case was determined post-Nationality and Borders Act 2022 regime, requiring the Tribunal to apply the two-stage test in section 32 NABA 2022, as clarified by JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) (Botswana) [2024] UKUT 100 (IAC).

The FTTJ summarised the legal framework by reference to:

  1. MAH (Egypt) [2023] EWCA Civ 216, on the proper approach to credibility assessment in asylum claims;
  2. Paposhvili v Belgium [2017] Imm AR 867 and AM (Zimbabwe) [2020] UKSC 17, concerning Article 3 ECHR medical claims; and
  3. TZ (Pakistan) & PG (India) [2018] EWCA Civ 1109, confirming that satisfaction of the Immigration Rules on private life is positively determinative of proportionality under Article 8.

The appellant’s protection claim relied on two Convention grounds:

  1. Imputed political opinion, derived from her father’s political activism; and
  2. Membership of a Particular Social Group (PSG), as a single woman in Sierra Leone, a group the Home Office accepted faced discrimination and societal disadvantage.

Representation and Advocacy

At the outset of proceedings, Sonya successfully applied for the appellant to be treated as a vulnerable witness, relying on the detailed Report prepared by a Clinical Psychologist. The Tribunal accepted that the appellant suffered from moderately severe Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and Major Depressive Disorder (MDD), and accordingly applied the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No. 2 of 2010 to ensure appropriate procedural adjustments.

During the hearing, Sonya made detailed oral submissions supported by a comprehensive Appellant’s Skeleton Argument, engaging directly with both the credibility issues and the evidential gaps raised in the refusal letter.

Her submissions highlighted:

  1. The internal consistency and plausibility of the appellant’s account, including her explanations for delays in claiming asylum, supported by her mental health evidence;
  2. The gendered dimension of the persecution faced, including cyber-harassment and the misuse of intimate imagery as a tool of intimidation, contextualised by country expert evidence;
  3. The report of the Country Expert, which confirmed that women in Sierra Leone continue to face entrenched patriarchal barriers, limited state protection, and impunity for sexual and technology-facilitated violence; and
  4. The absence of any meaningful family support network or access to treatment in Sierra Leone, reinforcing both her risk and the “very significant obstacles to reintegration” under Appendix Private Life of the Immigration Rules.

In addressing the Respondent’s reliance on section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004, Sonya advanced a nuanced argument that delay in claiming asylum was explicable and did not go to the core of the claim, given the appellant’s psychological fragility and cultural stigma surrounding sexual violence.

She further submitted that the combination of the appellant’s gender, public profile, mental health, and absence of family support rendered internal relocation unduly harsh and unsafe, engaging both Articles 3 and 8 ECHR.

The Tribunal’s Findings

The Tribunal accepted the appellant’s evidence as credible, consistent, and corroborated by both the expert and medical material. The FTTJ expressly found that the appellant possessed characteristics engaging the Refugee Convention and faced a real risk of persecution on return.

In particular, the Tribunal held that:

  1. The appellant’s father’s political activity placed her within the scope of imputed political opinion, and her own visibility as his daughter made her identifiable to state actors;
  2. Single women in Sierra Leone constitute a PSG due to societal discrimination, lack of protection, and exposure to violence;
  3. The appellant’s previous victimisation through “revenge porn” and her trauma-related mental health conditions significantly heightened her vulnerability;
  4. There was no sufficiency of protection available and no viable internal relocation alternative as conceded by the Home Office; and
  5. Given her health and lack of support, there were very significant obstacles to reintegration, and her removal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences, breaching her Article 8 rights.

The Tribunal found that the appellant’s treatment and anticipated harm on return would amount to persecution for Refugee Convention reasons and to a violation of Articles 3 and 8 ECHR. The appeal was therefore allowed on all grounds.

Significance of the case

This case underscores the growing recognition within the asylum framework of gender-based persecution, particularly where intersecting vulnerabilities, such as online abuse, mental health conditions, and political imputation, coalesce to create real risk on return.

It also illustrates the practical operation of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022’s evidential framework, and how careful case preparation, expert evidence, and trauma-informed advocacy can ensure that credibility is assessed holistically and fairly.

The decision affirms that women facing both gendered harm and political association risk are entitled to the full protection of the Refugee Convention, and that “revenge porn” and technology-facilitated abuse can amount to serious persecution where state protection is ineffective.

Conclusion

Through detailed case preparation, careful management of vulnerability, and persuasive submissions grounded in expert and medical evidence, Sonya Kalyan succeeded in establishing that her client’s fear of persecution was both credible and well-founded, and that removal would breach her fundamental human rights.

Sonya continues to accept instructions in complex immigration and asylum matters, including those involving challenging factual matrix and country contexts.

To instruct Sonya, please contact the chambers’ immigration clerk at immigration@halcyonchambers.com.

 

The views stated in this article belong to the writers in a personal capacity. No warranty is given, express or implied, in respect of the contents of this article. Nothing in this article is tendered as or is intended to be taken as legal advice and the contents should not be construed or relied upon as legal advice. Specialist legal advice should always be taken in every case noting that the application of the law may vary according to the individual facts of the case and the nature of the dispute.

Section 7 Reports – when will the court depart from the recommendations of Cafcass in private law children proceedings?

 

The family court is frequently tasked with determining applications under section 8 of the Children Act 1989 (“the Act”).

However, with competing positions, interests and allegations, how is the court to determine, for example, with whom the child should live, or whether one parent should be prevented from taking certain steps they would ordinarily be entitled to take? Such orders naturally and necessarily infringe on the rights a parent would normally enjoy by virtue of their parental responsibility and are therefore serious orders with significant consequences for the child and their parents.

How does the court go about making such important decision? The court normally orders the production of a welfare report under section 7 of the Act, which provides:

“7 Welfare reports.

(1) A court considering any question with respect to a child under this Act may—
(a) ask an officer of the Service or a Welsh family proceedings officer; or
(b) ask a local authority to arrange for—
(i) an officer of the authority; or
(ii) such other person (other than an officer of the Service or a Welsh family proceedings officer) as the authority considers appropriate,
to report to the court on such matters relating to the welfare of that child as are required to be dealt with in the report.”

Frequently, but not exclusively, Cafcass are tasked with producing the report[1]. The role of Cafcass is outlined on their website:

 “We independently advise the family courts about what is safe for children and in their best interests. We focus on their needs, wishes and feelings, making sure that children’s voices are heard and are at the heart of the family court’s thinking and decision making. Our duty is to safeguard and promote the welfare of children going through the family justice system.” [2]

The aim of the section 7 report is to establish what is happening for the subject child, to analyse their situation and, applying the welfare checklist, make recommendations in their best interests. Therefore the advice given by Cafcass in a section 7 report is of central importance to the court in reaching its decision; ultimately they are the independent professionals who give recommendations.

The court therefore rightly places a great amount of reliance on the section 7 report when deciding what orders, if any, to make. This was highlighted by Thorpe LJ in Re W (residence) [1999] 3 FCR 274:

“Judges are hugely dependent upon the contribution that can be made by the welfare officer, who has the opportunity to visit the home and to see the grown-ups and the children in much less artificial circumstances than the judge can ever do.”

However, the section 7 report is not the final word as the court is always the ultimate arbiter of the welfare best interests of any child. In Scott v Scott [1986] 2 FLR 320 Dillon LJ highlighted the point, noting that the role of Cafcass is to:

“…investigate the circumstances of the child or children concerned and all the important figures in their lives, so as to provide the court with reliable factual observations and factual details which will be the base on which a Judge can form his own opinion.” (emphasis added).

Therefore, the question is when can a court depart from the recommendations of a Cafcass officer?

Firstly, the court should have an evidential basis to justify a departure from the recommendations of the section 7 report.  In Re B (Care: Expert Witnesses) [1996] 1 FLR 667, Ward LJ stated:

“The expert advises but the Judge decides. The Judge decides on the evidence. If there is nothing before the court, no facts or no circumstances shown to the court, which throw doubt on the expert evidence, then, if that is all with which the court is left, the court must accept it. There is, however, no rule that the Judge suspends judicial belief simply because the evidence is given by an expert.”

And Butler-Sloss LJ added:

“An expert is not in any special position and there is no presumption of belief in a doctor however distinguished he or she may be. It is, however, necessary for the Judge to give reasons for disagreeing with experts’ conclusions or recommendations. That, this Judge did. A Judge cannot substitute his own views for the views of the experts without some evidence to support what he concludes.” (emphasis added).

Secondly, Butler-Sloss LJ highlights the requirement to give reasons when recommendations are not followed, pursuant to the authorities of W v W (A Minor: Custody Appeal) [1988] 2 FLR 505 and Re W (Residence) [1999] 2 FLR 390, which were subsequently confirmed in Re R (Residence Order) [2010] 1 FLR 509 where Ward LJ stated at paragraph 36:

“Mr Hepher draws our attention to Re W (Residence) [1999] 2 FLR 390 at 395 where Thorpe LJ said:

“… Authority has established clearly, since at least the decision of this Court in W v W (A Minor: Custody Appeal) [1988] 2 FLR 505, 513, that judges are not entitled to depart from the recommendation of an experienced court welfare officer without at least reasoning that departure.”

Thirdly, Re R also deals with the important issue of whether the court is required to explore with the Cafcass Officer in oral evidence any issues they may have with their recommendations and any potential departure they may have in mind.

The decision of the court was not unanimous on the issue with Ward LJ dissenting. Rix LJ and Moore-Bick LJ concluded that, unless there are strong reasons to do otherwise, in a report with clear recommendations that a judge should hear from the Cafcass officer before reaching a different conclusion. This follows the earlier decision of Re A (Children: 1959 UN Declaration) [1998] 1 FLR 354 which “emphasises the importance of the judge testing any misgivings that he may have developed from the written report of the welfare officer in the witness box.”[3]

In Re R Rix LJ stated at paragraph 59:

“Similarly, I consider that the judge has erred in rejecting Dr Cochrane’s conclusions without hearing Dr Cochrane for himself. It is widely recognised in the authorities that this should not happen if it can be avoided. Thus in Re CB (Access: Attendance of Court Welfare Officer) [1995] 1 FLR 622 at 629(CA), Purchas LJ said:

‘In cases where there are clear-cut recommendations and warnings such as those present in the second report, as indeed there were in the first report, in my judgment, it is wrong for a judge to proceed to form conclusions directly contrary to such recommendations without availing himself of the opportunity of receiving further assistance from the court welfare officer in the form of evidence. It is open to the judge to adjourn the case and demand the presence of the court welfare officer. The court welfare officer may vary his opinion in the light of the evidence or in the light of points put to him by the judge or, alternatively, he may hold his opinions. Whichever event occurs, the judge, having availed himself of the opportunity of receiving the further evidence, may then make his decision applying his own discretion. But to apply his discretion without availing himself of that opportunity is, in my judgment, a defective exercise of discretion.’

In Ward LJ’s dissenting judgment on this issue, he interpreted Re CB as recognising that it is a matter of discretion as to whether court needs oral evidence from Cafcass[4]. He also highlighted the practical difficulties of have a Cafcass officer available every time to give oral evidence, referencing the potential delays and “procedural straitjacket”[5] mentioned by Hale J in Re C (Section 8 Order: Court Welfare Officer) [1995] 1 FLR 617.

However, Rix LJ addressed the decision of Re C at paragraph 60:

“In Re C (Section 8 Order: Court Welfare Officer) [1995] 1 FLR 617, the judge upheld the status quo (residence with the mother) in accordance with (and not contrary to) the slight preference of the court welfare officer, but the complaint of the father was that he should not have done so without adjourning to permit the officer to attend. However, the judge had been able to see the teenage boy in question to obtain his own views. This court dismissed the appeal, upholding the judge’s exercise of discretion not to adjourn. Hale J said that where a report was without any firm recommendation in any particular direction, it was unnecessary to adjourn and it would have been open to the judge to conduct his own evaluation of the relevant considerations and to weigh them slightly differently, even in favour of the father, without the presence of the court officer. She added (at 620):

‘Thus the case of Re CB cannot be a hard-and-fast rule of law. Procedural straitjackets in cases of this kind would be most undesirable, especially in the light of the balancing act which is required by the paramount consideration of the child’s welfare and the provisions as to delay in s 1(2). Many factors will have to be taken into account in the exercise of the court’s discretion. These will include how much further assistance the court welfare officer can give, and the extent to which it would be safe and proper to depart from any recommendations made.’

Rix LJ upheld the principle espoused by Hale J in Re CB that in marginal cases, without clear recommendations in either direction, the court is entitled to conduct its own evaluation and reach its own conclusions without hearing from the Cafcass officer. He appears to have concluded that this is not inconsistent with Re CB which requires the court to hear from the Cafcass officer should they look to depart from “clear cut recommendations”. In doing so, Rix LJ highlighted the dichotomy the court must draw between marginal cases and those with firm recommendations in order to determine whether oral evidence from the Cafcass officer should be called upon before departing from the recommendations.

The authorities recognise that there is not an absolute rule when it comes to hearing oral evidence from a Cafcass Officer (or not) when considering making an order contrary to their recommendations. It seems the firmer the recommendation and the more significant the departure, the greater the need becomes for the court to hear oral evidence from the Cafcass officer.

Conclusion

It remains unusual for the views of Cafcass to be significantly departed from. It is notable that all of these cases were decided a number of years ago. It is a settled legal position.

The court therefore must (and clearly should) place a large amount of reliance on the recommendations of Cafcass in coming to decisions in cases. It is open to the court in these cases to come to a different conclusion, provided that the reason for the departure can be clearly explained, based on evidence and realistically having heard evidence on the point to test any misgivings about the section 7 report.

[1] Alternatively it may be a social worker employed by the local authority. However, for the purposes and remainder of this article I will refer only to Cafcass or a Cafcass Family Court Advisor).

[2] Cafcass website as of September 2025

[3] Thorpe LJ in Re W (Residence) [1999] 2 FLR 390 at 395

[4] Paragraph 40

[5] Paragraph 41

Another successful defence of a £40,000 Home Office Civil Penalty (Illegal Employment) appeal by Tony Muman

 

HHJ Evans sitting at the Manchester County Court dismissed an appeal against a Civil Penalty Notice in the amount of £40,000 issued to an employer following a data sharing from HMRC.  As a first breach, the maximum penalty was £45,000 which was reduced to £40,000 in line with the Code of Practice.

The employee was somebody who had entered the UK as a dependent and then overstayed.  Although the employer appealed on the principle basis that it was not liable for a penalty or in the alternative had a statutory excuse, in the course of argument at the hearing it accepted that as a result of employing someone who did not have the right to work, it was liable and because it did not carry out the prescribed checks, could not rely on the statutory excuse.  The only issue left was whether the penalty amount was too high.

Tony Muman was instructed for the Secretary of State to defend the appeal.

HHJ Evans rejected the employer’s claim that the Secretary of State had failed to exercise her discretion properly.  The learned judge found that not only was the Secretary of State entitled to exercise her discretion to issue the penalty, but that she was right to do so.  HHJ Evans rejected the submission that the Secretary of State acted unreasonably, finding that the law is absolutely clear and the process by which checks are to be carried out specified in the statute and statutory instruments.  The learned judge agreed with the employer that £40,000 was a large amount of money, especially for an employer who up until that point was of good character.  But, that  is the figure that the Secretary of State and Parliament has chosen to set the starting point at, noting that it was now significantly higher than it used to be.  The employer was also ordered to pay the Secretary of State’s costs.

Tony Muman is an expert in civil penalty cases and was instructed by Lauren Pritchard at Keoghs Solicitors.

For any booking enquiries, please contact the civil clerk at civil@halcyonchambers.com