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Halcyon Chambers is delighted to announce that Simon Villau and Sonya Kalyan have accepted offers of tenancy.

This comes after both successfully completed pupillage under the supervision of Katie Wilkinson and Tony Muman respectively.

During their Pupillage year, both Sonya and Simon gained experience in all of Chambers’ core specialist areas including Civil, Family and Immigration Law. Both have proved incredibly popular with our Instructing Solicitors and already have experience of work above the level of their Call.

Everyone at Halcyon Chambers welcomes both as Members of Chambers and we look forward to seeing their careers grow over the coming years.

Any enquiries in relation to the availability of either Sonya or Simon should be directed to the Clerks.

Article by Christine Rutkowski

Yehuda Tescher v. Direct Accident Management and AXA Insurance UK Plc v. Spectra Drive Limited [2025] EWCA Civ 733

Two recent appeals have considered the question of when and in what circumstances a non-party credit hire company should be made liable for a Defendant’s costs in a credit hire claim.  It is worthy of note that the guidance provided by the Court of Appeal considered cases where the Claimant was protected by Qualified One-Way Costs Shifting (QOCS) and where the Claimant was alleging that they were impecunious.

Both cases had their origins in claims brought for damages including personal injury and credit hire following road traffic collisions; therefore QOCS applied.  In each case, albeit for different reasons, costs orders were made against the Claimant and in favour of the Defendant. However, due to the effect of QOCS, neither of those costs orders were enforceable. The Defendants each applied for a non-party costs order (NPCO) against the credit hire companies. Those applications were refused; however permission to appeal was granted and the cases were sent straight to the Court of Appeal for consideration (given the disparity of decisions on NPCOs at County Court level).  The Justices allowed the appeals and gave guidance as to when non-party costs orders would be made in QOCS cases where credit hire charges were included.

Background to Tescher v. Direct Accident Management Limited (DAML)

On 19 November 2018 the Defendant, Mr. Tescher’s vehicle struck the Claimant (Mr Quesda’s) motorcycle. The Claimant signed successive credit hire agreements with DAML. In due course, the Claimant brought proceedings. The Particulars of Claim included a claim for general damages for personal injury and the sum of £19,633.36 for credit hire charges incurred over a period of 88 days hire. Those credit hire charges represented over 85% of the value of the special damages claim. The Claimant pleaded a positive case that he was impecunious in accordance with Lagden v O’Connor [2004] 1 AC 1067.

The matter was listed for a Fast Track trial before District Judge Swan in the County Court in Clerkenwell & Shoreditch on 08 December 2022 where the Judge dismissed the claim and directed that the Claimant pay the Defendant’s costs, not to be enforced without permission of the court, as QOCS applied. However, directions were given for DAML to be joined as a Second Defendant for the purposes of considering an application for an NPCO.

The application came before District Judge Jeffs on 10 May 2023, who dismissed the application for an NPCO, as he was not satisfied that DAML was the “real party” or that DAML had caused costs to be incurred, which otherwise would not have been incurred save for DAML’s involvement. Mr. Tescher sought permission to appeal.

Background to AXA Insurance UK Plc v. Spectra Drive Limited (Spectra)

On 23 October 2019, the Claimant (Ms. Nicola Smith) was involved in a road traffic incident with a vehicle insured by the Defendant (AXA) and liability was admitted.  The Claimant’s vehicle was written off and on the same date, she entered into a credit hire agreement with Spectra. The credit hire lasted for 89 days. On 24 August 2020, the Claimant’s issued proceedings directly against AXA and her claim included general damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenity (PSLA) as well as a claim for special damages of £16,160.94 – the lion’s share of which was made up of credit hire charges. Again, the Claimant pleaded impecuniosity and sought to recover from AXA the full credit hire rate and as in the DAML case, all aspects of the claim for credit hire charges were put in issue by AXA.

Despite making a claim for 89 days of credit hire, there was evidence that the Claimant had insured another vehicle after 10 days, which (AXA asserted) proved that the Claimant had been fundamentally dishonest in bringing her claim.  The Claimant subsequently discontinued her claim on 28 May 2021 – later explaining that she had simply done what her solicitors “told her” to do. The usual costs order under CPR r. 38.6(1) followed – with the Claimant ordered to pay the Defendant’s costs not to be enforced without permission of the court pursuant to QOCS.

On 29 June 2021, AXA brought an application for two orders. One was an order setting aside QOCS protection on the grounds of fundamental dishonesty. The other was for an NPCO against Spectra.

The application came before Deputy District Judge Carson on 18 February 2022. The Claimant represented herself with Spectra and AXA respectively represented by Counsel. DDJ Carson found that the Claimant had not been fundamentally dishonest because the vehicle that she had insured 10 days after the accident had not been available for her to use until she received the benefit of the total loss claim and that she had used the hire car during the claimed period.

The NPCO application was adjourned and after a second hearing; further written submissions and a substantial delay; an order was made in AXA’s favour requiring Spectra to pay 65% of AXA’s costs.

On appeal to HHJ Gargan, various findings of fact made by DDJ Carson were overturned and AXA’s application for a non-party costs order was refused.  In his judgment, HHJ Gargan concluded that Spectra was the principal beneficiary of the proceedings throughout and held that there were some factors which distinguished this case from a standard credit hire claim.  However, what the Judge called AXA’s “good fortune in escaping a judgment and costs” was also considered a factor which suggested that it would not be ‘just’ to make a costs order against Spectra.

The Appeals

Permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal was granted in both cases and it was directed that they be conjoined.  The Appellants in both DAML and Spectra contended that NPCOs ought to have been made against the respective credit hire companies.

The Court of Appeal considered in detail the law relating to Credit Hire in general at [20 – 24]; NPCOs at [25 – 33]; QOCS and its exceptions at [34 – 45]; authorities on NPCOs generally and High Court decisions on NPCOs made in credit hire cases after the implication of QOCS at [46 – 64], following which Lord Justice Birss (giving the leading judgment) gave guidance applicable to NPCOs in credit hire cases – suggesting that a two-stage process should be approached by the court in the exercising of its discretion in such cases and applications as follows:

It should firstly be asked whether in the circumstances an NPCO of some kind should be made against a credit hire company (which involves examining if the non-party costs jurisdiction is engaged) and secondly, if so, the amount of costs awarded should be decided (in so doing, determining what a ‘just’ costs order would be – including questions of attribution).

In the DAML case, it was held that the credit hire company is the real beneficiary of the claim for damages for the credit hire charges and had tacit control over the litigation. The causation and control aspects of the test to engage the NPCO jurisdiction were therefore satisfied. There were no other special circumstances which suggested that no order should be made at the first stage and an NPCO ought to be made.  Regarding the second stage of the exercise, it was found that as DAML’s credit hire charges were several times larger than the damages for personal injury, DAML were ordered to pay all of the Defendant’s costs.

In the case of Spectra, it was held that an NPCO would be the ‘just’ outcome.  The fact that the claim which was discontinued would or might well have succeeded does not justify a different order.  Further, as the DDJ’s original order required Spectra to pay 65% of the costs and this had not been challenged in respect of apportionment, the original NPCO was restored.

Conclusion

The Court of Appeal confirmed that the elements of a credit hire case – when taken together – are enough for a court to conclude that “absent some reason why not” an NPCO against a credit hire company is likely when a costs order is made against a QOCS protected Claimant.

In relation to Stage 1 of the process, where the claim includes a claim for hire obtained on credit (i.e. where payment is deferred by reference to an action for damages) and there is an allegation that the Claimant is impecunious, for all intents and purposes litigation (including settlement) is the only realistic means by which the credit hire company will be paid for hire.  It therefore follows that the credit hire agreement (for which the credit hire company is responsible) is a “fundamental cause of the legal costs incurred by the Defendant” which is sufficient to satisfy the requirement for causation for NPCO purposes.  A ‘but for’ causation approach was considered unnecessary.  Further, Lord Justice Birss found that a credit hire company has sufficient control of the litigation as a result of the structure of credit hire arrangements – absolute control is not required.

It was also found that “as a matter of reality” (both practically and economically) a credit hire company is the real beneficiary of the litigation for damages in respect of credit hire.  They are essentially the ‘real party’ in a claim which includes credit hire charges.

As for Stage 2 (the amount of costs payable), in cases where the credit hire claim is several times larger than the personal injury claim (as was the case in both DAML and Spectra), the Court of Appeal found that an order for all the Defendant’s costs would be payable – absent some special feature.

The Court of Appeal’s judgment can be found here.

In an appeal against a civil penalty of £10,000 imposed on J. N. Dairies Limited for allegedly employing Veerpatap Singh, who was discovered to be working illegally in the UK, Tony Muman was instructed by the Government Legal Department for the Secretary of State.

J. N. Dairies contested both the liability for the penalty and its amount, while the Secretary of State asserted that Singh was employed by J. N. Dairies during the relevant period.

Her Honour Judge Wall heard the appeal over two-days sitting at the Birmingham County Court.

Factual Background

J. N. Dairies is a family-owned dairy business. On 2 November 2023, immigration officers entered the business premises and encountered Singh cleaning a van. Singh had a complex immigration history, having overstayed his visa and claimed asylum, which was subsequently refused.  The central issue was whether Singh was indeed employed by J. N. Dairies or present for other reasons.  J. N. Dairies argued that Singh was on site as a favour to his uncle, an employee of J. N. Dairies, and not as an employee.

Legal Framework

The Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 prohibits the employment of individuals who do not have the right to work in the UK.  The Secretary of State can impose penalties for violations of this provision.  The appeal process allows employers to contest the imposition of penalties based on liability or the amount of the penalty.

Burden of Proof

A preliminary issue arose as to which party bore the burden of proof.  HHJ Wall was asked to rule on the issue determinatively for the first time in a civil penalty appeal issued for illegal working.

It was common ground that the standard of proof to be applied is the balance of probabilities, which is the usual standard in civil proceedings. The primary issue in contention was the allocation of the burden of proof.

Leading Counsel for J. N. Dairies contended that the burden of proof rested with the Secretary of State relying on the statutory scheme’s reference to the appeal being by way of re-hearing (see s17(3) IANA).  His contention was that since a penalty is only imposed if the Secretary of State satisfies itself of the conditions for its imposition, it must therefore be for the Secretary of State to satisfy the Court in a re-hearing.  He also argued that the State had imposed a financial penalty and as such the State bore the burden of proof to establish the factual basis for the penalty.

Tony Muman argued that the statutory language in s17(1) IANA explicitly places the burden on the employer to show they are “not liable”, and that the reference to a “re-hearing” does not imply that the Secretary of State must bear the burden of proving its case again.  Instead, it means that the court undertakes a merits-based approach to the appeal, considering all evidence presented, including evidence not before the Secretary of State when the penalty was imposed (see s17(3)(b)).  This position is supported by appellate-level authorities, particularly the Court of Appeal’s guidance in Akbar v Secretary of State for the Home Department EWCA Civ 16 and Khan v HM Revenue and Customs EWCA Civ 89.  In Akbar, the Court observed that s17(1) “places the burden on an employer to demonstrate to the court that it is not liable” (paragraph 8).  In Khan, the Court stated that the general principle is that where a statute provides a right of appeal against enforcement action by a public authority, the burden of establishing the grounds of appeal lies with the employer (paragraph 70).  This principle is reinforced where the relevant facts are within the employer’s knowledge (paragraph 71).

Upon reviewing the arguments and authorities, HHJ Wall concluded that Tony Muman’ssubmissions were correct.  In this appeal, it was for J. N. Dairies to prove its case.  The weight of appellate authority recognises the general principle that an appellant bears the burden of proof in a civil penalty appeal.  The “re-hearing” of the decision to impose the penalty refers to a merits-based approach that is not limited to the material before the Secretary of State and does not reverse the usual burden of proof on an appeal.

On instruction Tony Muman agreed that this general principle can be disapplied if there is something in the statute or the nature of the appeal that supports a contrary position.  However, neither applied in this context.  Section 17(1) IANA provides that the employer may appeal on the grounds that they are not liable, are excused payment, or the penalty amount is too high.  This statutory wording is consistent with the general rule that the employer must establish the grounds of appeal.

The real nature of the appeal is whether Singh was employed by J. N. Dairies.  This issue was peculiarly within the knowledge of J. N. Dairies, not the Secretary of State.  Therefore, there was no basis for departing from the usual approach that it is for the employer to show that it is not liable for the penalty.

Similarly, there is no basis for departing from the usual approach when considering the appeal against the quantum of the penalty.  Neither the statutory language nor the essential nature of the appeal provides any basis for doing so.  Further, where an employer wishes to present additional factors to support a departure from the penalty approach set out in the Code, those factors are within the employer’s knowledge, not the Secretary of State’s.

Findings and Reasons

HHJ Wall held that Singh was indeed employed by J. N. Dairies.  The evidence presented, including Singh’s actions at the time of the encounter and the context of the intelligence leading to the immigration officers’ visit, supported this finding.  The explanation provided by J. N. Dairies regarding Singh’s presence was found to be unconvincing.

• The encounter occurred while Singh was engaged in tasks typically performed by an employee.
• The timing and circumstances of the encounter suggest regular employment rather than a casual visit.
• The alternative explanation offered by J. N. Dairies was dismissed due to inconsistencies and lack of credible evidence.

 Amount of Civil Penalty

HHJ Wall also addressed the second ground of appeal, namely the amount of the civil penalty to be paid.  The court recognised that there was a discretion to impose a penalty at all, but held that the £10,000 penalty was appropriate given the circumstances of the case.  J. N. Dairies arguments for mitigation, including their cooperation with authorities and the social context of Singh’s presence, were deemed insufficient to justify a reduction.

Conclusion

The appeal was dismissed, and the civil penalty of £10,000 upheld with J. N. Dairies having to pay the Secretary of State’s costs of defending the appeal.

Tony Muman is an expert in Civil Penalty Notice appeals and accepts instructions for both Employers and the Home Office. 

For any booking enquiries relating to Tony Muman please contact his clerk cridley@halcyonchambers.com

Ramby De Mello leading Tony Muman and Susana Ferrín of No5 Barristers’ Chambers defend claim in the High Court alleging that the Government of India hatched or maintained a plan in the UK to forcibly abduct and smuggle by yacht to a Caribbean island Mr Mehul Choksi for the purpose of extracting a false confession under torture and to unlawfully render him to India where he is wanted over his alleged involvement in one of India’s biggest bank frauds, said to be in the region of $1.8billion.

In a very high profile case, Mr Mehul Choksi alleges that the Government of India conspired with named individuals and entered into an unlawful means conspiracy in the UK to unlawfully render him to India from the Caribbean.  For a more detailed background of the alleged facts, see the decision of Robertson J in the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, Antigua and Barbuda.

Ramby, Tony, and Susana act for the Fifth and Sixth Defendants, instructed by Galwinder Kang at Murria Solicitors.

On Monday 16 June 2025 Mr Justice Freedman conducted a case management hearing, dismissing the Indian Government’s application that its State Immunity application should be bifurcated from the jurisdictional complaints raised by the other defendants.

The case raised important points about jurisdiction and immunity which are yet to be decided.

The case will next come before the High Court over a five-day hearing to determine arguments on State Immunity and Jurisdiction.

For press reports, see:

• The Times, “‘Kidnapped’ diamond tycoon sues Indian government in London”
• Reuters, “Fugitive jeweller Choksi accuses India of orchestrating his kidnap in Antigua”
• The Hindu, “Mehul Choksi takes ‘kidnapping’ allegations against India to U.K. court”
• Bloomberg, “Diamond Tycoon Alleges India Abducted Him to Extract False Confession”
• The Economic Times, “Diamond tycoon Mehul Choksi claims India abducted him to extract false confession”
• The Telegraph: “Diamond Tycoon ‘kidnapped and smuggled on to yacht in honeytrap plot’”

For any booking enquiries for Ramby or Tony, please contact the clerks at clerks@halcyonchambers.com, or on 0121 237 6035.

Article by Jamie Hughes

Mr Joshua Parker v (1) Skyfire Insurance Company Limited (2) Spectra Drive Limited [2024] EWHC 1060 (KB)

This case concerned a High Court appeal from the County Court at Liverpool and considered, primarily, an application by the Defendant for non-party disclosure under CPR 31.17. The underlying claim included a claim for credit hire following a road traffic accident.

The disclosure sought included recordings of telephone calls said to include representations made to the Claimant in advance of him signing the hire documents. While the focus of the original judgment and the appeal was on the application itself, this necessitated discussion about whether such evidence was likely to support or adversely affect either party’s case. Almost inevitably, this led to a discussion about misrepresentation in credit hire in more general terms.

The court made a number of important observations when considering the enforceability of hire contracts based on alleged misrepresentations:

• It is not uncommon in credit hire cases for the claimant to be told -incorrectly – that he or she will have no personal liability for the hire charges. (§24)
• There was rightly no suggestion in this case that the contract was unenforceable or invalid because Mr Parker did not understand what he was signing. It is well-established that it unnecessary for a contracting party to have understood the true nature of the contract in order to be bound by it: Burdis v Livsey [2002] EWCA Civ 510 (§31)
• The effect of a misrepresentation is only to render a contract voidable at the option of the innocent party. It is not thereby rendered automatically unenforceable. A voidable contract is valid unless and until it is avoided. Avoidance requires the innocent party to take some step to rescind the contract. Rescission is not available unless it is possible to make restitutio in integrum. A contract cannot be rescinded if it has been affirmed by the innocent party with full knowledge of the facts and of his or her right to avoid (§32).

The court highlighted that the two most relevant questions above related to affirmation and restitution.

As regards affirmation, the Court stated that the correct question was whether the Defendant could point to a real prospect that the contract is both capable of being avoided in principle, and, if so, might in fact be avoided by the Claimant. This would be a factual question to be addressed in each individual case. In Skyfire, the Court found that Mr Parker had brought his claim to recover the charges in express reliance on the hire contract and maintained his opposition of the disclosure application through counsel. The Court therefore concluded that there was no basis for suggesting he might seek to avoid the contract having not done so to date.

However, the Court went on to consider whether avoidance is an option open to the Claimant at all if restitution can no longer be made. The hire agreement in this case was a contract for services which had been fully performed. Mrs Justice Dias referenced Chitty in saying:

‘In this respect, a contract for services is very different from, for example, a contract for the sale of goods where the goods themselves can be returned, even if it might be necessary to make some allowance for depreciation. Although there are indications that the courts might be prepared to adopt a slightly more flexible approach to restitution than in the past, it is still the case that a fully performed contract for services cannot be rescinded: Chitty (op.cit) paragraphs 10-139 to 10-140”

‘This, it seems to me, is an insuperable obstacle to avoidance of the contract which exists independently of any misrepresentation or affirmation. It follows that even if the application were granted and even if the disclosure fully supported a case of misrepresentation, Skyfire would be unable to establish any circumstances in which Mr Parker would be relieved of his liability under the contract with Spectra’

Misrepresentation arguments are made on a daily basis in county courts up and down the country in credit hire trials, however courts very rarely address the underlying contractual principles and instead focus almost entirely on whether there has been a factual misrepresentation. This decision is a stark reminder that the underlying legal principles remain fiercely relevant and should be engaged with on each occasion. The High Court was at pains to point out that “it is not possible to lay down any general rules” (§29) however it is difficult to see how, in light of the passages referred to above, misrepresentation defences can succeed in relation to hire agreements which have been fully performed.

Article By Harry Owen

Within the last week (01 April – 03 April 2025) the Supreme Court heard the three linked appeals of Johnson v FirstRand Bank (UKSC 2024/0158), Wrench v FirstRand Bank (UKSC 2024/0159) and Hopcraft & Anr v Close Brothers UKSC 2024/(0157).

Ultimately, the question being considered is what duty, if any, motor dealers owe to consumers when selling finance or whether finance was mis sold, and what compensation, if any, is due to the consumer.

The primary position advanced by Close Brothers and FirstRand Bank are, broadly, that the Motor Dealer is not a fiduciary, and in the alternative, if the Motor Dealer is a fiduciary, that consumers who complain should not be entitled automatically to a full refund of commissions paid.

Motor Dealer as a Fiduciary

The argument presented on behalf of consumers is that when it comes to selling finance, a Motor Dealer takes on a responsibility to act in a consumer’s best interest to the exclusion of all others, including their own.

The role of a fiduciary carries with it a duty either as a full fiduciary (i.e. to act solely in the best interests of the consumer) or alternatively, a lesser duty to provide customers with advice on finance on a disinterested basis. In either event, if acting as a fiduciary, and if a Motor Dealer is to receive commission from a finance company, the Motor Dealer must first obtain consent to do so from the consumer.

The primary basis for the appeal states that the Court of Appeal erred in finding that Motor Dealers owed a fiduciary duty to the consumer when selling finance.

Arguments in the Alternative

The alternate arguments put on behalf of Close Brothers and FirstRand Bank are applicable only if the Supreme Court places an enhanced duty on Motor Dealers.

The arguments forwarded create some tension between finance companies and Motor Dealers – potentially pushing the liability for any compensation away from lenders and toward the Motor Dealers.

Close Brothers and FirstRand Bank made further submissions in relation to secret commissions and, in particular, the case of Hurstanger Ltd v Wilson [2007] EWCA Civ 299. Close Brothers and FirstRand Bank proposed that different remedies should be considered in circumstances where a Motor Dealer disclosed the existence of commission, but not the amount.

This is important and likely to affect a great number of potential claims, as the majority of Motor Dealers relied upon standard paperwork which included disclosure of the potential existence of commission.

Submissions were made regarding the case of Plevin v Paragon Personal Finance Ltd [2014] UKSC 61 and the concept of an unfair relationship under s140 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. In Plevin it was found that a failure to disclose excessive commissions received in relation to Payment Protection Insurance payments, could result in an unfair relationship, entitling a consumer to compensation. Close Brothers and FirstRand Bank sought to distinguish the case of Plevin from the current case, on the basis that the nature of the commission was too dissimilar to provide a direct comparison.

The National Franchised Dealers Association

The Supreme Court also heard submissions from The National Franchised Dealers Association (NFDA), an intervenor in the case. The NFDA made submissions on behalf of Motor Dealers, setting out a background to the sales process, arranging of finance and the commercial realities of vehicle sales.

The NFDA focused on the Court of Appeal’s finding that the duties arising during vehicle sales were entirely separate from those arising when finance brokering, describing two distinct parts of the sale, with the Motor Dealer firstly dealing with the sale of the vehicle and then moving into an entirely separate role as a broker. The NFDA portrayed a more complicated and closely entwined process, where both the vehicle sale and the finance brokering take place simultaneously.

Submissions from both Close Brothers; FirstRand Bank and the NDA, averred that the Court of Appeal had gone too far in creating a fiduciary relationship between the Motor Dealer and the consumer that had never previously been present. This position was later echoed by the Financial Conduct Authority, during its submissions.

Johnson, Wrench and Hopcraft

Submissions on behalf of Johnson, Wrench and Hopcraft, took a differing approach, focusing to a much greater degree on the claim of bribery and the liability for and quantum of awards.

The focus on bribery was significant, perhaps because if it enables a claim to be made directly to the finance companies for cancellation of the contract and return of all monies and payment of the commission to the consumer. If found, this would greatly increase the potential quantum of claims made by consumers.

There were limited submissions by Johnson, Wrench and Hopcraft attempting to establish that there was a fiduciary relationship, or a duty to provide disinterested advice, suggesting that Motor Dealers have undertaken a classic finance broker role in assessing a consumer’s needs and recommending products that are appropriate.

This approach resulted in numerous judicial interventions, from seeking clarification as to the precise nature of the duty owed to how these circumstances could be distinguished from similar sales situations where a fiduciary relationship does not exist.

Representations were also made by Johnson, Wrench, and Hopcroft averring that an unfair relationship under s140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1977 was created in the circumstances of the three cases under review. Johnson, Wrench, and Hopcroft attempted to draw a direct analogy between Plevin and the current case as well as to define the calculation of the commission by reference to the cost of the finance and not the finance agreement as a whole.

FCA Submissions

The FCA made submissions as an intervener, straddling the positions forwarded by the parties. The FCA expressed support for the contention that Motor Dealers are not a fiduciary, but conversely supported the contention that Motor Traders have a duty to provide disinterested advice in order to protect consumers. The FCA averred that the application of a Plevin– like approach to the current facts was appropriate and suggested that the calculation of the commission as a percentage of the cost of finance and not the full cost of the loan was the most suitable approach.

The FCA provided expert guidance on the regulatory regime and their interpretation and expectations of a Motor Dealer’s role and the nature of the relationship between the dealer, the consumer, and the finance provider.

Conclusion

Much opinion has been published in recent days, speculating as to the potential judgment of the Supreme Court. For every opinion that confidently predicts a victory for Close Brothers and FirstRand Bank, you will find one confidently predicting a victory for Johnson, Wrench, and Hopcroft. Perhaps tellingly, for each of those opinions, you will find a dozen or more, non-committal suggestions that the case could be determined either way.

Perhaps an outright ‘victory’ for either party is unlikely, with the prospect of an intermediate position being established as the most likely outcome. At this stage, at least those interested can take comfort from the fact that the next step towards clarity is on the horizon. The Supreme Court has indicated that judgment could be handed down as soon as July 2025, with the FCA anticipating publishing guidelines around 6 weeks thereafter, as necessary.

Until then, the wait continues…

Sonya Kalyan recently successfully represented a Namibian national before the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) in Newport.  This blog highlights the importance of robust legal argument and thorough case preparation in asylum appeals.

Sonya was instructed in this matter by Migrant Legal Project, a specialist organisation dedicated to providing expert legal advice and representation to vulnerable migrants, including asylum seekers, victims of trafficking, and those facing removal from the UK.  Their tireless commitment to access to justice for those in need was instrumental in achieving this positive outcome.

Background

The Appellant, referred to as ZVR due to an anonymity order, is a Namibian national who sought asylum in the UK.  She made her initial asylum application on 20 December 2022, which was refused by the Secretary of State for the Home Department (SSHD) on 9 January 2024.  Because ZVR’s application was made after 28 June 2022, it was considered under the provisions of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (NABA 2022), which introduced significant changes to the asylum framework, including a two-stage test for assessing refugee status.

ZVR’s claim was based on her fear of persecution due to her experiences as a victim of gender-based violence (GBV) and the systemic failures of the Namibian state to provide sufficient protection.

The appeal was heard on 7 March 2025 before First-tier Tribunal Judge Boyes, with the SSHD as the Respondent.

The Legal Framework

The appeal was considered under the Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Act 2002 and the NABA Act 2022. The key legal issues were:

• Whether ZVR’s claim fell within the scope of the Refugee Convention.
• Whether she had a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (namely, membership of a particular social group).
• Whether there was a sufficiency of protection in Namibia.
• Whether internal relocation was a viable option.

The Tribunal’s considerations and findings

The Tribunal noted that while the SSHD conceded ZVR’s nationality and the fact that she had suffered GBV, she did not accept that ZVR was claiming asylum for a Convention reason.  Specifically, the SSHD argued that women in Namibia do not form a Particular Social Group (PSG) under the Refugee Convention, relying on their Country Policy and Information Note (CPIN).  The SSHD argued that while ZVR was a victim of domestic violence, this alone did not amount to persecution for a Convention reason.

Sonya robustly argued against this position, submitting that ZVR possessed an innate characteristic beyond simply being a woman.  She was not only a woman but a victim of severe domestic and sexual violence in a society that does not provide adequate protection for such victims; highlighting that ZVR’s status as a survivor of GBV, combined with cultural and legal norms in Namibia, meant that she belonged to a PSG.

The Tribunal agreed, finding that ZVR’s experiences and the societal context in which they occurred established her membership of a PSG under the Refugee Convention, relying on jurisprudence such as Islam and Shah [1999] UKHL 20.

Sonya went on to argue, relying on expert evidence, that there is no sufficiency of protection in Namibia.  The expert report detailed how the dual judicial system, which includes both state and traditional courts, often results in GBV cases being treated as private matters, leaving victims without recourse.  It also outlined the significant cultural barriers preventing women from seeking protection, including societal norms that reinforce male dominance and discourage intervention by law enforcement.

The Tribunal accepted that, despite the existence of legal protections on paper, the reality was that state authorities failed to provide effective protection for victims of GBV in Namibia.

Sonya went on to argue that internal relocation was not a viable option for ZVR.  Namibia’s small population, the interconnected nature of Herero communities, and the cultural expectation that a woman remains under her husband’s control meant that relocation would not be safe or reasonable.

Again, the Tribunal accepted this argument, noting that ZVR’s former husband had a wide network and worked in transport across Namibia, making it highly likely that he would find her if she attempted to relocate.

Outcome and significance

The Tribunal allowed ZVR’s appeal on asylum grounds, granting her refugee status.  The appeal on humanitarian protection grounds was not necessary to consider as ZVR had succeeded in establishing a Refugee Convention claim.

This judgment reaffirms the importance of detailed factual development, use of expert evidence, and focused legal submissions in asylum jurisprudence.  It also underscores the barriers faced by women experiencing GBV in jurisdictions where societal and legal frameworks fail to offer genuine protection, and the UK’s duty to afford international protection to those at risk.

Sonya accepts instructions across all areas of immigration and asylum law.  To instruct her, please contact the immigration clerk.

• 0121 827 9435 – Civil
• 0121 481 2388 – Immigration
• 0121 481 2871 – Family

Counsel Emma Weaver recently advised and successfully represented the appellant father in the High Court sitting at the Royal Courts of Justice on an appeal to overturn findings made against the appellant father.

During the course of child arrangement proceedings, the matter came before the court at first instance for a 3-day contested, fact-finding hearing heard by the Designated Family Judge. The appellant father had a serious and far-reaching finding made against him namely that he had sexually abused his daughter who was then 4 years old. Consequently, he was denied a relationship with his daughter.

Whilst the appellant father did not have the benefit of legal representation during the fact-finding process, upon seeking advice from Emma, grounds of appeal and a skeleton argument were submitted to the High Court. The case was somewhat distinct in that the appellant father was significantly out of time for lodging an appeal and therefore, Emma firstly had to persuade the High Court that permission out of time should be granted.

Permission to appeal, along with appealing out of time, was considered on the papers and granted in light of Emma’s persuasive grounds of appeal and skeleton argument. Following the hearing of submissions, the High Court allowed the appeal and overturned the serious finding made against the appellant father. Findings will rarely be interfered with by an appellant court. However, Emma’s meticulous preparation and compelling advocacy played a pivotal role in securing the successful outcome of overturning the findings.

This success is a testament to Emma’s unwavering commitment to her clients and her profession.

The full judgment of the case can be found here.

By Sonya Kalyan, Counsel for the Claimant

Introduction

The case of Lafronte v Johnson [2025] EWFC 20 (B) is a stark illustration of the unintended consequences of systemic delays in the criminal courts.  The Family Court was required to adjudicate a committal application for breaches of a Non-Molestation Order (“NMO”) — an issue ordinarily reserved for the criminal courts.  This case not only highlights the interplay between the civil and criminal justice systems but also underscores the practical difficulties faced by victims of domestic abuse seeking enforcement of protective orders.

Legal Framework

Under the Family Law Act 1996, a NMO is designed to protect victims from harassment, threats, or violence.  Breach of such an order constitutes a criminal offence under section 42A of the Act, punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment.  However, where criminal prosecution is not feasible or is delayed, the civil courts retain jurisdiction to enforce compliance through contempt proceedings, as affirmed in Hale v Tanner [2000] 2 FLR 879.

The evidential threshold for contempt proceedings is the criminal standard — proof beyond reasonable doubt.  In Lafronte v Johnson, the Family Court was compelled to assume a role typically reserved for the criminal justice system due to delays in listing the Defendant’s criminal trial until December 2026 — over five years after the initial breach.

Factual Background and Analysis

The Claimant, Lydia Lafronte, alleged five breaches of the NMO made in April 2021 and extended until April 2023. The breaches occurred between June 2021 and June 2022. The Family Court found three of the five breaches proven:

1. 20 June 2021 – Unlawful Attendance at the Claimant’s Home: The Defendant attended the Claimant’s home on Father’s Day despite being prohibited from doing so. Although the visit was facilitated by the Claimant’s parents, the court found that the Defendant bore responsibility for ensuring compliance with the NMO (Re W (Abduction: Committal) [2011] EWCA Civ 1196).

2. 26 October 2021 – Prohibited Telephone Contact: The Defendant initiated a telephone call to the Claimant, claiming concern for their child. The court rejected the reasonable excuse defence, holding that alternative lawful channels of communication were available (Re L-W (Enforcement and Committal: Contact Orders) [2010] EWCA Civ 1253).

3. 24 June 2022 – Unlawful Email Communication: The Defendant directly emailed the Claimant, again in breach of the NMO. The court emphasised that indirect means of communication (e.g., through solicitors) were expressly mandated by the NMO.

The court dismissed the remaining two allegations due to evidential insufficiencies, particularly in relation to a disputed hacking claim where the Claimant’s evidence lacked corroboration.  However, these claims usually require substantial technological evidence to succeed.

Sentencing and Broader Implications

Applying the principles established in Hale v Tanner, the court considered both the punitive and deterrent objectives of sentencing.  Despite the gravity of the breaches, imprisonment was deemed disproportionate given mitigating factors, including the Defendant’s lack of further breaches post-April 2023, his role as a carer for his mother, and his apology to both the Claimant and the court.  Instead, the Defendant was fined £200, payable within 12 months; consideration of his means was also taken into account.

This outcome raises serious concerns.  While the Family Court provided some measure of justice, it lacked the full range of sentencing options available to the criminal courts, such as community orders.  Moreover, the necessity of these proceedings reflects the broader failure of the criminal justice system to address domestic abuse cases in a timely manner.  As Bianca Castro noted in the Law Society Gazette, criminal court delays are forcing family courts to fill enforcement gaps, resulting in fragmented and often inadequate relief for victims.

Impact on Victims

The impact of such delays on victims is profound. For individuals like Lydia Lafronte, the prolonged uncertainty exacerbates emotional distress and undermines confidence in the legal system’s ability to provide protection.  Victims often experience heightened anxiety, fear, and a sense of helplessness when enforcement mechanisms fail to deliver timely justice. The psychological toll can be severe, affecting their mental health, stability, and overall well-being.  In many cases, delays in legal proceedings force victims to make difficult personal and financial decisions, such as relocating or seeking additional protective measures at their own expense.  These failures highlight the urgent need for systemic reforms to ensure that victims are not left vulnerable due to bureaucratic inefficiencies.

Conclusion

Lafronte v Johnson is emblematic of a growing crisis in legal enforcement.  The Family Court should not have been placed in the position of conducting quasi-criminal trials due to systemic inefficiencies elsewhere.  The judgment serves as both a warning and a call to action — urgent reforms are needed to ensure that victims of domestic abuse receive timely and effective legal protection.  Until then, justice will continue to be delayed, and for many, effectively denied.

Read full judgment here.

For any booking enquiries, please contact the clerks at clerks@halcyonchambers.com

The views stated in this article belong to the writers in a personal capacity.  No warranty is given, express or implied, in respect of the contents of this article.  Nothing in this article is tendered as or is intended to be taken as legal advice and the contents should not be construed or relied upon as legal advice.  Specialist legal advice should always be taken in every case noting that the application of the law may vary according to the individual facts of the case and the nature of the dispute. 

by Paige Procter-Harris

A care order provides for the Local Authority to share parental responsibility with the parents of the children and the children whilst subject to a care order are ‘looked after’ children. Part 3 of the Children Act 1989 makes provisions for the duties placed upon local authorities in England for ‘looked after’ children.

In contrast the purpose of a supervision order is to ‘advise, assist and befriend the supervised children’, the Local Authority does not have parental responsibility nor the power to direct how anyone who has parental responsibility may exercise it under such an order as they do under a care order.

Factual background of Re: JW

The facts of Re JW are that three children were placed under a supervision order for the duration of care proceedings in the care of their mother. At the final hearing it was decided that all three children would remain in the mother’s care however, the Judge decided that a care order should be made rather than a supervision order, the mother of the children appealed this decision on two grounds:

1. The court was wrong to make final care orders instead of final supervision orders in circumstances where the care plans were for the children to remain at home with their mother.
2. Alternatively, in the event that the court had considered that more time was required for the mother to evidence the ending of the relationship with Mr P and/or her commitment to the proposed work, the court was wrong not to adjourn the final hearing and extend the proceedings.

Judgment of McFarlane LJ in Re: JW

McFarlane LJ in his Judgment considered the leading case law as well as the Presidents Public Law Working Group (PLWG) Guidance, whereby he further endorsed the recommendations of the PLWG and summarised them as follows:

1. a care order should not be used solely as a vehicle to achieve the provision of support and services after the conclusion of proceedings;
2. a care order on the basis that the child will be living at home should only be made when there are exceptional reasons for doing so. It should be rare in the extreme that the risks of significant harm to a child are judged to be sufficient to merit the making of a care order but, nevertheless, as risks that can be managed with the child remaining in the care of parents;
3. unless, in an exceptional case, a care order is necessary for the protection of the child, some other means of providing support and services must be used;
4. where a child is to be placed at home, the making of a supervision order to support reunification may be proportionate;
5. where a supervision order is being considered, the best practice guidance in the PLWG April 2023 report must be applied. In particular the court should require the local authority to have a Supervision Support Plan in place.

Within his Judgment McFarlane LJ also considered the Judgment of Hale J in Oxfordshire County Council v L [1998] 1 FLR 70 and Hale LJ’s approach in Re: O (Supervision Order) [2001] EWCA Civ 16; [2001] 1 FLR 923, he noted ‘Sharing of parental responsibility by the local authority with parents is an important element, but, as Hale J/LJ stressed, the fact that considerable help and advice may be needed over a prolonged period is not a reason, in itself, for making a care order;

vii) it is wrong to make a care order in order to impose duties on a local authority or use it to encourage them to perform the duties that they have to a child in need;

viii) the protection of the child is the decisive factor, but proportionality is key when making the choice between a care and supervision order for a child who is placed at home;

ix) supervision orders should be made to work, where that is the proportionate form of order to make.’

In Re: JW the local authority was clear that the measures that it would take to monitor and support the family would be the same whether a care order or a supervision order was made.

Outcome of the Appeal

The Court of Appeal allowed the mother’s appeal on ground one, holding that the Judge was in error in holding that this case was exceptional and that a care order was the proportionate and necessary order to be made but rejected ground two. Supervision orders were made in respect of all three children in place of the care orders.

This Judgement reinforces that when children are to be returned to or remain placed in their parent’s care then there must be exceptional circumstances that warrant a need for a care order to be made as opposed to a supervision order that would provide the same oversight necessary for the welfare of the children.

For any booking enquiries, please contact the clerks at clerks@halcyonchambers.com

The views stated in this article belong to the writers in a personal capacity.  No warranty is given, express or implied, in respect of the contents of this article.  Nothing in this article is tendered as or is intended to be taken as legal advice and the contents should not be construed or relied upon as legal advice.  Specialist legal advice should always be taken in every case noting that the application of the law may vary according to the individual facts of the case and the nature of the dispute. 

Keywords: Care Proceedings, Care Order, Supervision Order, McFarlane LJ, The Presidents Public Law Working Group, The Children Act 1989, Hale LJ

by Tony Muman (Deputy Head of Chambers)
and Muhammad Ul-Haq

Posted 3 February 2025

A claimant based in the EU providing international consultancy services.  A defendant with a registered office in London but otherwise part of a multi-billion-dollar global entity based in the Middle-East.  Neither has a trading presence in the UK.  The defendant’s business relates to online streaming and entertainment.  Following a dispute, the claimant instructs lawyers based in Birmingham.  The defendant corresponds through its in-house legal department.  There are no witnesses based in the UK.  The dispute relates to international broadcasting rights following a deal brokered in a third country.  The contract was negotiated and agreed by email.  The jurisdiction clause stipulates the Courts of England & Wales.  The value of the claim is substantial.  The commercial dispute has no connection to the UK.

Where does the claimant issue its claim?     

The claimant elected for the Business and Property Courts in Birmingham.  Admittedly, this was a lawyer-driven decision; the lawyers were based in Birmingham.  But it also reflected not only the legal principles but also the pride Birmingham lawyers have for their home court and the cultural and symbolic importance of  regionalisation.  It reflected the fact that the Birmingham District Registry is not lacking in capacity, technology, resources, or expertise to handle an international multi-million-pound claim.  It reflected the sentiment that high level litigation is not London-centric or reserved to the multinational firms operating in the City.  And, perhaps most of all, it reflected the fact that Birmingham offers the best after-work curry in the country (from a biased perspective!)

Post-issue, the defendant instructed solicitors based in London but with regional and international offices.  The firm’s website lists on the ‘Contact’ page under the header ‘Our Offices’ a location in Birmingham.  The defendant applied for a transfer to the Business and Property Courts of England and Wales at the Rolls Building in London on the basis that:

• The claim has more significant links to London than to Birmingham in that the defendant’s registered office and its solicitors are based in London, in contrast to the only link to Birmingham being that the claimant’s lawyers are based there;
• The defendant wishes for the case to proceed in London; and
• The international aspect of the claim and the fact that witnesses are based abroad makes it more preferable for the case to proceed in London, where there are better international transport links.

The application indicated that the defendant would notify the receiving court of the Transfer Application by letter to the issues desk of the Chancery Division at the Rolls Building; enclosing a copy of the application notice and enclosures.

The application was resisted.

The Law on Transfer Proceedings

The High Court has the power under CPR r.30.2(4) to order proceedings (or any part of them, such as a counterclaim or an application) to be transferred from:

• The Royal Courts of Justice to a District Registry
• A District Registry to the Royal Courts of Justice
• A District Registry to another District Registry

An application for a transfer from the Rolls Building to or from the B&PCs District Registry or vice versa or from one District Registry to another, must be made to the court from which the transfer is sought and must additionally be discussed with and consented to by the receiving court: PD57AA paragraph 3.1.

The power to transfer is discretionary and is exercised by the court having regard to the criteria in CPR 30.3.

In relation to transfers involving the Business and Property Courts, PD 57AA paragraph 3.1(3) provides that in addition to the criteria in CPR 30.3(2), the court must also have regard to:

• significant links between the claim and the circuit in question, considering the factors listed in paragraph 2.3(3) and (4);
• whether court resources, deployment constraints, or fairness require that the hearings (including the trial) be held in some other court than the court into which it was issued;
• the wishes of the parties, which bear special weight in the decision but may not be determinative;
• the international nature of the case, with the understanding that international cases may be more suitable for trial in centres with international transport links; and
• the availability of a judge specialising in the type of claim in question to sit in the court to which the claim is being transferred.

In relation to significant links, PD57AA paragraph 2.3(3) states a link to a particular circuit is established where—

• one or more of the parties has its address or registered office in the circuit in question (with extra weight given to the address of any non-represented parties);
• at least one of the witnesses expected to give oral evidence at trial or other hearing is located in the circuit;
• the dispute occurred in a location within the circuit;
• the dispute concerns land, goods or other assets located in the circuit; or
• the parties’ legal representatives are based in the circuit.

In Bellinger and another v Mercer Ltd and another [2014] EWHC 372 (Ch), the court was asked to transfer proceedings from the Manchester District Registry to the Royal Courts of Justice, London.  The High Court refused the application, considering it”neither necessary nor appropriate“.  In reaching its decision, the court considered the criteria for a discretionary transfer order in CPR 30.3(2).  HHJ Pelling KC took the following factors into account:

• The location of the parties’ solicitors and counsel. The judge considered the fact that counsel for the parties and the defendants’ solicitors were based in London to be nothing more than of “incidental importance“, as the claimants’ solicitors were based in Manchester.  It was likely that the claimants would have to undertake more work; this tipped the balance in favour of the case being continued in Manchester.
• The financial cost of the claim. Although the judge accepted that travel to, and accommodation in, Manchester would involve additional costs, they would be minor compared to the costs of the litigation   (He also noted that it was routine for counsel to travel between the two cities for specialist Chancery proceedings such as these.)
• The speed at which trial could be arranged, the availability of docketing, and the ability to list applications at short All these factors were in favour of keeping proceedings listed in Manchester.
• The location of witnesses for the defendants, who were said to be based predominantly near London. The judge considered that the benefit to the claimants of an earlier trial date outweighed the cost of travel and accommodation in Manchester (for a short trial), which, as he had already pointed out, would be minimal in comparison to the cost of the proceedings.

In Lumbermans Mutual Casualty Company v Bovis Lend Lease Ltd [2004] EWHC 1614, the court held that in addition to CPR 30.3(2), the transferee court should also consider the overriding objective when deciding to transfer a case or not.  This mirrors the requirement contained in CPR 1.2 which requires the court to give effect to the overriding objective when exercising any power under the rules.  The overriding objective, in particular, requires inter alia the court to put the parties on an equal footing, save expense and consider the financial position of each party.

The suitability, and indeed desirability, of keeping cases in regional B&PCs, such as Birmingham, is reflected in The Business and Property Courts of England & Wales ‘An Explanatory Statement’ dated 18th May 2017.  Co-authored by Sir Geoffrey Vos, the Chancellor of the High Court and Sir Brian Leveson, President of the Queen’s Bench Division, it states:

How will the regions benefit from the introduction of the B&PCs?

Lord Justice Briggs’ reports have consistently recommended, and the Judicial Executive Board has accepted, that no case should be too big to be tried outside London. We should be able to provide an integrated Business & Property Courts structure across England & Wales.  The aim is to achieve a critical mass of specialist judges sitting in each of the Business & Property regional centres so that all classes of case can be managed and tried in those regions.  At the moment, many such cases migrate to the Rolls Building for a multitude of inadequate reasons. Once there, they are often tried by a section 9 circuit judge from the region whence the case originated.  It should become easier to transfer regional cases back to the regions for management and trial. Waiting times are considerably less in the regional centres than they are at the Rolls Building.  In all the Business & Property Courts and Lists, a High Court judge can be provided to try an appropriate case outside London.

In Arif and others v Berkeley Burke Sipp Administration Ltd [2017] EWHC 3108 (Comm), the B&PC in Bristol consideredthe defendant’s application to transfer the claim from the Bristol District Registry to the Royal Courts of Justice in London.  HHJJonathan Russen KC, the specialist Circuit Commercial/TCC Judge at the B&PCs in Bristol, considered the guidance on transfer ofproceedings set out in the B&PCs Practice Direction and the B&PCs Advisory Note alongside the criteria set out in CPR 30.3.  His conclusion that the proceedings should remain in Bristol is consistent with the ethos, articulated by Lord Briggs and Sir Geoffrey Vos, that no case should be too big for the regions.  The judge commented that a core tenet of the B&PCs structure was to give due recognition to regional specialism and expertise.  Arif also highlights the need for detailed practical evidence to prove one venue is more convenient than another.

In circumstances where the factors each party relies on are fairly balanced, or broadly cancel one another out, the court’s established approach has been to maintain the status quo.   It is incumbent on the defendant to justify the transfer by reference to “significant factors” (plural).

In Tai Ping Carpets UK Limited v Arora Heathrow T5 Limited [2009] EWHC 2305 (TCC), the court refused to transfer proceedings in favour of the claim remaining in Birmingham.  Coulson J (as he then was):

[14] Although very many of the factors cancel each other out, I have concluded that the balance of convenience favours keeping this case in Birmingham. There are two particular matters to which I have had regard in arriving at that conclusion.

[15] First, it seems to me that, in the absence of any significant factors favouring the transfer to London, I should keep this case in Birmingham because that is what the claimant has requested. After all, it is the claimant who has gone to the trouble and expense of starting these proceedings, and it is the claimant who runs the costs risk, to the extent that its claim may ultimately be unsuccessful. These are the claimant’s proceedings and the responsibility for them rests with the claimant. If, therefore, the various other competing factors broadly cancel each other out, then it seems to me that I ought to give particular weight to the claimant’s choice of location for case management and trial.

[16] Secondly, again given the way in which the majority of factors cancel each other out in the present case, it seems to me that the court can and should have regard to the fact that inevitably, so it seems to me, proceedings which are case managed and tried in London will be more expensive than they would be if they were case managed and tried in one of the regional centres.

It is not for a claimant to justify its choice of venue in which the claim has been issued.  Equally, it is not for the claimant to persuade the court to keep the case in the regional B&PC: rather, it is for the defendant to persuade the court to transfer to London.  As HHJ Russen QC observed in Arif:

“[55] I would need to identify particular reasons why the coverage provided by the specialist business of the Bristol District Registry might be considered to be deficient for the purposes of case managing and trying these claims.”

Analysis

PD57AA section 2 (consisting of paras 2.1-2.4) falls under the hearing “Starting Proceedings”.  PD57AA section 3 (consisting of paras 3.1-3.3) falls under the heading “Transfers”.

Each section contains a self-contained sets of rules which deals with two different scenarios – one issue and the other transfer.  There is no cross-over between the two except where the rule expressly provides (for example paragraph 3.1(3)(a) on transfer cross-refers to the factors set out at paragraph 2.3(3) and (4) on issue, with the intent that when considering whether to transfer, the court can also take into account the criteria set out in the issue rule for or against transfer).  It has nothing to do with issue.

Under paragraph 2.2(1) the claimant “chooses which court… to issue its claim”.

Paragraph 2.3(1) states “the claimant must determine the appropriate location in which to issue the claim.”  To “determine” means to consider/to decide.

The choice of location is, self-evidently, for the claimant; and not to be undertaken in consultation with the defendant.  If paragraph 2.3(1) intended claimants to consult defendants before taking the decision where to issue, the draftsperson would have said so.  To suggest otherwise requires the court to read into the rule requirements which are not there.  The case law cited above talk of the claimant’s choice of venue.  If the defendant takes objection, the remedy is for it to apply for a transfer and to persuade the court to so order by reference to the transfer principles in para 3.1 of PD57AA, the Chancery Guide, and the case law.

The claimant’s choice of court is put beyond doubt by paragraph 2.5 which states “[w]hile any appropriate claim may be issued in any of the B&PCs District Registries…”.  The reference to ‘appropriate claim’ in para 2.5 is obviously not to be conflated with ‘appropriate location’ in paragraph 2.3.  What is an appropriate claim is understood by reference to the subject matter of the dispute (see paragraph 2.2).  Once a dispute which falls within the jurisdiction of the B&PCs arises (i.e., appropriate claim), it is for the claimant to determine where to issue (i.e., the appropriate location) by reference to paragraph 2.3.  The test is subjective and a matter of choice for the claimant, informed by the factors set out in the rule.  It is not open for the court to revisit the claimant’s determination of appropriate location because:

• the test is not an objective one in which the court could properly impute its own view/decision – the court does not sit in judicial review of a private citizen bringing a private law action;
• the CPR provides no mechanism in paragraph 2 to do so; and
• Paragraph 2.3 of PD57AA does not impose sanctions on a claimant for issuing in a particular court. It simply requires a claimant pre-issue to determine for itself the appropriate location which it considers for issue. It is not a brightline rule.

This is consistent with paragraph 2.5 (“While any appropriate claim may be issued in any of the B&PCs District Registries…”).  This is because the decision is a subjective one undertaken by the claimant.

Paragraph 2.3(2) mandates those claims with “significant links” to a particular circuit outside of London or the South-Eastern Circuit to be issued in that location’s B&PC District Registry.  The rule does not, in the same way, mandate that a claim with significant links to London must be issued in London.  This reflects the policy imperative behind regionalisation, which is an important factor for the court to balance.  One such example is where, by reference to paragraph 2.3(3)(e) the parties’ legal representatives are based in the circuit (“the circuit” means the particular circuit outside London or anywhere else in the South Eastern Circuit).  Properly understood, the rule prescribes that where the parties are represented by lawyers in a circuit outside of the South Eastern Circuit, then the claim must be issued in the B&PC District Registry in that circuit, and not in London.

It becomes clear that the mischief behind paragraph 2.3(2) was to direct claims to be issued in circuits outside of London.  But for paragraph 2.3(2), claims would continue to have been issued in London.  Paragraph 2.3(2) was introduced alongside the introduction of the B&PCs to kick start the principle of regionalisation (in other words, to stop claims being issued in London, as was conventional at that time).  There were similar rules introduced in public law judicial review claims with this very intention.

Unwittingly, the defendant’s submission in this case scored an own-goal.  By virtue of paragraph 3.1(3)(a), the court in deciding the Transfer Application was required to have regard to the fact that the parties’ legal representatives were both based in the Midlands Circuit.  To test the point, if the claimant was to issue its claim now based on a review of the defendant’s solicitor’s website, it could not be criticised for issuing in Birmingham (because both sets of lawyers are based in that circuit).  If it did issue in London, the claimant would be acting contrary to paragraph 2.3(3)(e) and the claim would probably be transferred from London to Birmingham by reference to paragraph 3.1(3)(a).

As stated in the cases and guidance referred to above, the following important principles emerge:

• There is only one High Court in England and
• The B&PCs in the regions have specialist judges and can deal with complex and high value cases.
• The speed at which trial could be arranged, the availability of docketing, and the ability to list applications at short notice are all factors in favour of keeping proceedings listed in the regional courts.
• Accessibility of witnesses travel into the regions is an important practical consideration.
• The benefit to the parties of an earlier trial date outweighs the cost of travel and accommodation in the regions (for a short trial), which would be minimal in comparison to the cost of the proceedings in London.
• The ethos, articulated by senior judges that no case should be too big for the regions and that a core tenet of the B&PCs structure was to give due recognition to regional specialism and expertise.

Of the potential links to Birmingham and London in this case, the only actual difference separating the parties was that the defendant’s registered office is in London.  If the defendant were an individual, CPR 26.2(1)(d), requires automatic transfer to his ‘home court’ being a place “in which the defendant resides or carries on business” (CPR 2.3(1)(b)).  The provisions regarding automatic transfer to a defendant’s home court apply only where the defendant is an individual.  The CPR draws a deliberate distinction between an individual and a company, recognising that for companies the same imperative/need/policy reasons to transfer to the individual’s home court does not apply.  Further, the automatic transfer provisions are disapplied when the claim is commenced in a specialist list (CPR 26.2(2)).

Whilst the location of the registered office meets the definition of a link under PD57AA paragraph 2.3(3)(a), it is not per se a significant link (PD 57AA paragraph 3.1(3)).

In absence of a strong justification for transfer to London, the practice is that the court will place significant weight on the claimant’s choice of venue and the obvious point that cases outside of London will be less expensive to litigate.

It is always worth emphasising that the claimant’s lawyers will be doing the heavy lifting in litigating the claim, including preparation of bundles and filing documents with the court.  The size and nature of the firm is an important factor to balance.  Regional accessibility to the High Court extends equally to High street law firms, in the same way as it does to claimants. Regionalisation across all divisions of the High Court recognises that London, and London firms, no longer have a monopoly on cases which traditionally could only be issued in the Royal Courts of Justice.  There is a public interest of constitutional importance in ensuring accessibility to justice across the regions, which the case law on transfers has long recognised.  Regional small firms may not have offices in London and would not be able to absorb the costs of setting up a temporary office in London.  Fee-earners based in the regions will be billing cases at commensurate non-London hourly rates and not able to charge London weighting if the matter was transferred to London.  Firms will be effectively billing a London case at non-London rates.  To transfer the case to London will effectively mean having to transfer the file to a London firm.

Even if the competing factors are not entirely evenly balanced and lean towards transfer to London, it is insufficient to disturb the status quo by removing a case from its current venue and depriving a claimant from its choice of venue: see Edwards-Stuart J’s observations in CFH Total Document Management Ltd v OCE UK Ltd & Anor [2010] EWHC 541 (TCC) at [29] – [31].

A Knock-out Blow

The burden is on the defendant to demonstrate (i) that it has put the receiving court on notice of the transfer application, and that the receiving court has consented to the transfer, and (ii) assuming consent has been granted if the application is contested, that the above factors clearly weigh in favour of a transfer.  The rules are clear and the court has no discretion to depart from them.

In this case, the application suggested that the defendant would notify the receiving court. The claimant was not sent a copy of any notification, and nothing was exhibited to the application.  Fundamentally, the claimant had not seen anything to suggest that the Rolls Building had been informed that the defendant’s application to transfer was contested and that the matter had been listed for hearing.  Critically, the claimant had not seen anything to suggest that the Rolls Building has consented to transfer from Birmingham to London.

At the hearing, the claimant argued that if notice had not been given, or if the Rolls Building had not been told that the Transfer Application is contested and listed for hearing, and or if consent had not been granted by the Rolls Building, the application fails procedurally and an order for transfer cannot be made (‘a knockout blow’).  Not only is this compulsory under PD57AA, but section 3.24 of the Chancery Guide 2022 (which is mirrored at paragraph 28 of the Chancellor’s Advisory Note on the Business & Property Courts dated 13 October 2017) requires the consent to accompany the application to transfer:  “…the application should be accompanied by confirmation that the applicant has obtained the consent of the receiving court…”

Paragraph 3.1(2) is unequivocal.  Before an application for an order for transfer between registries of the B&PC can be made, two things must take place.  First, alongside the application to the B&PC from which transfer is sought, the applicant must inform the intended receiving B&PC of the application (“Notification”).  Second, the application must be consented to by the receiving B&PC (“Consent”).  Notification and Consent are pre-requisites and are two distinct elements.  This is also made clear in the Chancery Guide, which stipulates that the application should be accompanied by confirmation that the applicant has obtained the consent of the receiving court.  The reason why consent is so important is that there are critical considerations relating to the intended receiving court’s capacity and resources.

The B&PC from which transfer is sought can only then go on to consider the factors at paragraph 3.1(3) once these two pre-cursor events have taken place.  This is made clear from the words “When considering whether to make an order… the court must also have regard to-…”  Also denotes in addition to the requirements in paragraph 3.1(2).

*The claim was settled by consent after the hearing but before the court handed down judgment.

Tony Muman leading Muhammad Ul-Haq acted for the claimant.

For any booking enquiries, please contact the civil clerk at civil@halcyonchambers.com

The views stated in this article belong to the writers in a personal capacity.  No warranty is given, express or implied, in respect of the contents of this article.  Nothing in this article is tendered as or is intended to taken as legal advice and the contents should not be construed or relied upon as legal advice.  Specialist legal advice should always be taken in every case noting that the application of the law may vary according to the individual facts of the case and the nature of the dispute. 

Keywords: Transfer, District Registry, Business and Property Courts, Birmingham High Court, CPR r.30, PD57AA, Consent, Rolls Building, B&PC

Halcyon Chambers are pleased to announce the election of Tony Muman as Deputy Head of Chambers. 

Tony was called to the bar in 2001. He is a vital member of Halcyon Chambers, heading up both our Immigration and Public Law teams. 

Tony is a recognised expert in immigration, asylum, and nationality law and has appeared in cases at all levels, including the European Courts and the Supreme Court. He has received several rankings from the prestigious Chambers and Partners, as well as having received several awards throughout his distinguished career.

On Saturday 7th December, Counsel Tony Muman and our Civil Clerk, Jamie Adams, attended the Young Citizens Mock Trial Competition.

This was a brilliant opportunity for Chambers to engage with local schools in the Hertfordshire area and inspire the next generation of legal minds, alongside a judging panel including Lord Justice Males, His Honour Judge Siddiqui, His Honour Judge Godfrey, Tinessa Kaur, and Ralph Muncer.

Thank you to Rebecca Harrison from Young Citizens for reaching out to us, and Bukola Faturoti PhD, SFHEA for helping co-ordinate this. We are always happy to support events such as these, whether local or national.

Our main telephone line is currently down and our engineers are looking into re-establishing communications as soon as possible.

Should you need to contact the clerks please do so on 0121 728 0573 or via their individual contact details below.

Chris Ridley – Senior Clerk – 0121 481 2388 – cridley@halcyonchambers.com

Civil Clerk – 0121 827 9435 – civil@halcyonchambers.com

Family Clerk – 0121 481 2871 – family@halcyonchambers.com

We thank you for your patience.

Halcyon Chambers is delighted to announce that the Pupillage Application Form for candidates to complete is now live. This form, together with the Equality and Diversity Form and Consent Form, can be found on our Recruitment page.

Please read the instructions carefully and send the completed documents to pupillage@halcyonchambers.com.

Halcyon Chambers wish all candidates good luck in their applications.

All members of staff at Halcyon Chambers wish you a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year!!