Ramby de Mello and Tony Muman act for the Appellant who protests that being compelled to give evidence via video-link from Jamaica is in breach of GDPR instructed by Sanjeev Sharma at JM Wilson Solicitors.
Article by Tony Muman
The Surinder Singh principle, or ‘route’ as commonly referred to, takes its name from the old Court of Justice judgment in R v IAT and Surinder Singh ex.p. SSHD Case C-370/90  3 CMLR 358. The Court had to decide whether Community law grants a right of residence to a national of a non-member country who is the spouse of a Community national when the latter returns to work in his or her own country having in lived and worked in another member-State. The Court held that in the context of Mr Singh’s British wife, she had activated her Community status by working in Germany and that activation continued its effects when she returned to the United Kingdom, and that one of those effects was the right of Mr Singh – an Indian national – to accompany her with an entitlement to live and work in the United Kingdom whilst they remained married; in the same way that she could if she were a German national moving to the United Kingdom to live and work.
Regulation 9 of the Immigration (EEA) Regulations 2006/1003 gave effect to the (‘the Surinder Singh principle’) and, as enacted provided:
Family members of United Kingdom nationals
9.—(1) If the conditions in paragraph (2) are satisfied, these Regulations apply to a person who is the family member of a United Kingdom national as if the United Kingdom national were an EEA national.
(2) The conditions are that—
(a) the United Kingdom national is residing in an EEA State as a worker or self employed person or was so residing before returning to the United Kingdom; and
(b) if the family member of the United Kingdom national is his spouse or civil partner, the parties are living together in the EEA State or had entered into the marriage or civil partnership and were living together in that State before the United Kingdom national returned to the United Kingdom.
(3) Where these Regulations apply to the family member of a United Kingdom national the United Kingdom national shall be treated as holding a valid passport issued by an EEA State for the purpose of the application of regulation 13 to that family member.
On 1 January 2014 the Immigration (European Economic Area) (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 2013 / 3032 amended Regn 9 inter alia of the 2006 Regulations. The changes were said to ensure that a British citizen engages in genuine and effective use of the rights conferred by Directive 2004/38/EC before a right to reside in the United Kingdom is conferred on a non-EEA family member. Regn 9 was amended still further on 25 November 2016. The general consensus was that the Home Office introduced these changes to try and ‘plug the hole’ which many British citizens seeking to be reunited with family members were falling back on, relying on rights under EU law rather than the pernicious and often insurmountable UK immigration rules post July 2012. Many interpreted this change as another way to try and achieve the reduction of net migration that the then Home Secretary seemed obsessed with.
The decision in this appeal was taken under Regn 9 of the Immigration (EEA) Regulations 2016 / 1052 which came into force on 1 February 2017. As amended Regn 9 provides:
Family members of British citizens
9.—(1) If the conditions in paragraph (2) are satisfied, these Regulations apply to a person who is the family member (“F”) of a British citizen (“BC”) as though the BC were an EEA national.
(2) The conditions are that—
(i) is residing in an EEA State as a worker, self-employed person, self sufficient person or a student, or so resided immediately before returning to the United Kingdom; or
(ii) has acquired the right of permanent residence in an EEA State;
(b) F and BC resided together in the EEA State; and,
(c) F and BC’s residence in the EEA State was genuine.
(3) Factors relevant to whether residence in the EEA State is or was genuine include—
(a) whether the centre of BC’s life transferred to the EEA State;
(b) the length of F and BC’s joint residence in the EEA State;
(c) the nature and quality of the F and BC’s accommodation in the EEA State, and whether it is or was BC’s principal residence;
(d) the degree of F and BC’s integration in the EEA State;
(e) whether F’s first lawful residence in the EU with BC was in the EEA State.
(4) This regulation does not apply— (a) where the purpose of the residence in the EEA State was as a means for circumventing any immigration laws applying to non-EEA nationals to which F would otherwise be subject (such as any applicable requirement under the 1971 Act to have leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom); or (b) to a person who is only eligible to be treated as a family member as a result of regulation 7(3) (extended family members treated as family members).
(5) Where these Regulations apply to F, BC is to be treated as holding a valid passport issued by an EEA State for the purposes of the application of these Regulations to F.
(6) In paragraph (2)(a)(ii), BC is only to be treated as having acquired the right of permanent residence in the EEA State if such residence would have led to the acquisition of that right under regulation 15, had it taken place in the United Kingdom.
(7) For the purposes of determining whether, when treating the BC as an EEA national under these Regulations in accordance with paragraph (1), BC would be a qualified person—
(a) any requirement to have comprehensive sickness insurance cover in the United Kingdom still applies, save that it does not require the cover to extend to BC;
(b) in assessing whether BC can continue to be treated as a worker under regulation 6(2)(b) or (c), BC is not required to satisfy condition A;
(c) in assessing whether BC can be treated as a jobseeker as defined in regulation 6(1), BC is not required to satisfy conditions A and, where it would otherwise be relevant, condition C.
The Appellants, both Afghan nationals, are elderly dependents of their British son (‘the Sponsor’). The sponsor decided to relocate to Poland where he set up a business. He moved to Poland first and was to be later joined by his wife and children. In the meantime, he was joined in Poland by the Appellants who were granted family permits as his ‘family members’ and then residence cards valid until 2021. The Sponsor’s wife and children subsequently had a change of heart and decided not to relocate to Poland, ultimately resulting in the Sponsor returning to the UK accompanied by the Appellants. They then applied (even though they perhaps did not need to) to be issued with a residence card, the refusal of which is the subject matter of this appeal.
The Home Office refused the application on the basis that the Sponsor had not provided adequate evidence in support of the application. Specifically, he had failed to prove that he was economically active in Poland as a self-employed person and that his residence in Poland was genuine. The focus of the appeal fell therefore on the Sponsor.
The appeal was heard on 26th April 2018 at the First-tier Tribunal. Tony Muman represented the Appellants. Before the tribunal the Appellants argued inter alia that the ‘centre of life’ test and the requirement to demonstrate a degree of integration is unlawful and contrary to EU law and that the correct enquiry in a case like this focuses on whether the Appellants and the Sponsor have been, or were formerly, residing in Poland in accordance with Directive 2004/38/EC; further that there is no minimum time period to have been spent in the host Member State, either for the Sponsor or the Appellants alone or jointly and to insist on such criteria would undermine the very essence of freedom of movement; also, that Regn 9 cannot be used to deter or penalise the Union citizen Sponsor for having exercised Treaty rights with the Appellants. In a determination promulgated 4th May 2018 the tribunal dismissed the appeal applying the Regulation 9(3) criteria. The Appellants appealed to the Upper Tribunal maintaining the view that the ‘centre of life’ test and the requirement to demonstrate a degree or integration is unlawful and contrary to EU law.
On 16th July 2019 Upper Tribunal Judges Rintoul and Coker sat to hear the appeal. Ramby de Mello and Tony Muman represented the Appellants. Having heard argument the Upper Tribunal delivered an ex tempore judgment holding that the FTT determination contained material errors in law and was unsustainable. The panel observed that that much of what is contained in Regn 9 on which the Secretary of State placed reliance is not found in the directive or in the treaty or in the caselaw, and appeared to be contrary to the Advocate General’s opinion in O & B v The Netherlands C-456/12. The UT held that there is no requirement for someone to have sole residence in the host member state; nor is there a requirement that that residence has to be permanent and that said person has to demonstrate integration.
The Upper Tribunal set aside the determination of the First-tier tribunal and adjourned to consider the test question whether the mere production of a residence card issued by another member state is a sufficient basis to be determinative of the application.
The same principle was repeated by Upper Tribunal Judge Rintoul in the subsequent case ZA (Reg 9. EEA Regs; abuse of rights) Afghanistan  UKUT 281 (IAC).
Tony Muman appeared for the Appellants in both the First-tier and the Upper Tribunal instructed by Habib Hussain at Guildhall Solicitors.
Please contact the clerks for any further information.
Immigration analysis: The Supreme Court’s decision on the minimum income requirement (MIR) for partners of non-European Economic Area (EEA) nationals seeking leave to enter is considered by Tony Muman, barrister, at 43 Temple Row Chambers.
An informal event designed for conversation and networking, rather than a formal lecture, attendees will be provided with a written delegate pack containing Tony’s views on the judgment and how to use it to help your clients. There will be refreshments, and an opportunity to network with other Midlands immigration professionals.
The event will be held on Wednesday 8 March 2017 at 5.30pm. The event is completely free of charge, and the City Centre venue will be confirmed shortly.
Please indicate whether you can attend by emailing the clerk’s at firstname.lastname@example.org, and we look forward to seeing you.
The Supreme Court has dismissed the Government’s Appeal in R (on the application of Miller), AB Parties v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union.
In what has been described as one of the most important constitutional cases for generations, Mr Tony Muman with the assistance of Mr Thomas Green, both of 43 Temple Row Chambers, represented the AB parties in this judicial review to determine the need for Parliamentary authority to give notice of withdrawal from the EU under Article 50(1) of the Treaty of the European Union.
The Supreme Court held that the Government cannot exercise prerogative powers to give notice pursuant to Article 50 without primary legislation been enacted by parliament. Fundamentally, the Court held that it is only Parliament that can pass laws which interfere with the rights of individuals which have been enshrined in law by Parliament.
The Government will now have to introduce legislation to be laid before Parliament. It is for Parliament, in light of the arguments made on behalf of the AB parties, to consider to what extent to protect the fundamental rights of EEA nationals and other residents in the UK before Article 50 is Triggered.
Supreme Court grants Permission to Appeal against ‘Deport First Appeal Later’ provision
The Supreme Court (Lords Kerr, Reed and Toulson) has today granted permission to appeal in R (Byndloss) v Secretary of State for the Home Department  EWCA Civ 1020. The Court of Appeal judgment is at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2015/1020.html
The appeal concerns the correct interpretation of the new ‘deport first, appeal later’ rules under section 94B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
Section 94B gives the Secretary of State the power to certify the human rights claim of a person liable to deportation where she considers that to do so would not be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (public body not to act contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights). The effect of such a certification is that any appeal must be brought from outside the United Kingdom.
Section 94B affects persons whose deportation is said by the Secretary of State to be conducive to the public good. It is part of the overall drive to move appeal rights out of country; an approach expanded in the current Immigration Bill, to other human rights appeals.
The Home Secretary, during the second reading of the Bill, said ‘The 2014 Act shows that “deport first, appeal later” works when foreign criminals make human rights claims. Our manifesto committed us to extending that to all human rights claims. The Bill will now deliver on that commitment, allowing us to remove people with no right to be in the UK before they can appeal, provided that does not breach their human rights or cause serious irreversible harm.’
Mr Byndloss has eight children in the UK. Having had Indefinite Leave to Remain he is liable to deportation. The Secretary of State certified his human rights claims, focusing initially only on the question of whether removal pending an appeal would cause ‘serious and irreversible harm’.
Those who have been dealing with such cases since section 94B came into force will be familiar with the ‘serious and irreversible test’. Home Office caseworkers have routinely been interpreting the legislation and guidance to remove would-be appellants where it was considered that removal would not breach article 3 ECHR, whilst effectively ignoring article 8 ECHR.
At the Court of Appeal, the Secretary of State conceded that that interpretation of the legislation is wrong. The Court confirmed that ‘Even if the Secretary of State is satisfied that removal pending determination of an appeal would not give rise to a real risk of serious irreversible harm, that is not a sufficient basis for certification. She cannot certify in any case unless she considers…that removal pending determination of any appeal would not be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act.’
This was markedly different to the approach taken in the Secretary of State’s guidance to caseworkers to date. The Court of Appeal declared that her guidance on section 94B is ‘inaccurate and misleading in focusing as it does on the criterion of serious irreversible harm’ and will now have to be rewritten.
Despite this important ruling on the guidance, Mr Byndloss challenges the certification based on arguments as to procedural protections and the best interests of his children were either rejected on the facts or not confronted by the court, leading his judicial review claim to fail. In the meantime, a stay on his deportation has been granted.
Tony Muman is instructed for Mr Byndloss.
For all enquiries please contact the clerks.
43 Temple Row Barristers Appear in the Supreme Court to Challenge Minimum Income Visa Rules
Thursday 25 February 2016
Over the course of a three day hearing between 22-24 February 2016, a seven judge bench of the Supreme Court has considered the linked appeals in MM (Lebanon) and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department and SS (Congo) v. Entry Clearance Officer, Nairobi. A write up of the Court of Appeal’s judgment can be found here and the High Court here.
The appeals concerned the Home Office Minimum Income Rules which require a British citizen, a lawfully settled person or a refugee in the UK, to be earning an income of at least £18,600 per annum, rising to £22,400 with the first child and increasing by £2,400 per child thereafter, before being allowed to sponsor a non-EU national partner or spouse. In order to demonstrate the £18,600 the Rules prevent the sponsor from relying on savings less than £16,000 or on promises of third party support or an offer of employment that the incoming spouse or partner may have secured.
It was argued that the £18,600 requirement was grossly excessive and unobtainable for the majority of the working population particularly given the restrictions on how it could be met. Furthermore, the Appellants argued that the Minimum Income Rules disproportionally impacted those in low-income occupations, refugees, women and certain ethnic groups. The Appellants submitted that the rules were inconsistent with the States’ statutory duty to have regard to the best interests of children and were incompatible with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the right to respect for private and family life) and Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) and that the rules set out by the Secretary of State amounted to significant breaches of individual’s rights which would in many cases last a lifetime. The Home Office guidance on when to apply discretion in the favour of an applicant who did not meet the Minimum Income Rules was in itself unlawful because it imposed a series of thresholds and tests of exceptionality before it could be considered.
Both MM and SS are refugees. Master AF is the nephew of MM, although they have a special father/son relationship. Neither MM or SS are able to return to their home countries to enjoy a family life with their spouses because of a continuing risk to them there. They argued in part that the Immigration Rules fail to draw this obvious and very important distinction between them and those who are able to enjoy family life elsewhere. They also pointed out that the Minimum Income Rules were forcing British citizen sponsors out of the UK solely in order to live with their family members whose admission was otherwise barred as a result of not earning the required amounts.
The Supreme Court has reserved its decision and judgment is expected in a number of months.
Tony Muman appeared for the Appellants MM, Master AF and SS
Joseph Neville appeared with Mr Muman for the Appellants Master AF and SS
Tony Muman recently wrote an article for LexisNexis following the outcome of the Bibi case at the Supreme Court which can be viewed by clicking on the link below.
Supreme Court rules on pre-entry English language tests
On 18 November 2015 the Supreme Court handed down judgment in R (on the applications of Ali and Bibi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department  UKSC 59. The cases concerned a challenge to the introduction in 2010 of an Immigration Rule. The Rule imposed a requirement that spouses or partners from certain non-EEA countries who wish to marry British Citizens or persons settled in the UK should first learn a certain level of English, and pass a test, before they join their spouses or partners in the United Kingdom.
In a long awaited decision the Supreme Court has not yet finally concluded what the result ought to be. The Supreme Court has decided to invite further submissions on whether it would be appropriate to give declaratory relief on how the Rule ought to be applied to reflect the Court’s concerns which are set out in the judgment.
Through-out the litigation, which started in 2010 in the Administrative Court, the appellants had alleged that the Rule was contrary to the right to respect for family life in the European Convention of Human Rights (Article 8). Although the Rule contains the possibility of an exemption in exceptional circumstances, the appellants had also made submissions at each stage of the litigation that the Secretary of State’s interpretation of ‘exceptional circumstances’, as set out in Home Office Guidance, was too narrow and showed that the Rule would be applied unlawfully in contravention of Article 8. The judicial review claims were dismissed by the High Court and by the Court of Appeal by a 2-1 majority decision.
In the Supreme Court, Lady Hale gave the first judgment, with which Lord Wilson agreed. She said that she would refuse the remedy of striking down the Rule or declaring it invalid because, as framed, it was capable of being applied compatibly with Article 8. But she went on to say that the operation of the Rule, in the light of the Guidance, was likely to be incompatible with Convention rights in a significant number of cases. She concluded that there was likely to be some benefit, both to individuals and to those administering the Rule, in declaring that the application of the Rule would be incompatible with Convention rights in certain types of cases such as where it would be impracticable without incurring unreasonable expense for a foreign spouse or partner to gain access to the necessary tuition or to take the test. Lord Hodge and Lord Hughes also recognised that the Guidance ought to be amended because it would lead in a number of cases to a breach of Article 8.
Lord Neuberger said that he saw considerable attraction in granting declaratory relief to reflect the concerns that the whole Court had about the application of the Guidance. He said that this was an important and sensitive topic, and it would be unfortunate if there was no formal record of the Supreme Court’s concerns. A final decision will however be made after considering further submissions from the parties. The appellants have therefore filed written submissions formally seeking declaratory relief in relation to the Guidance. The Secretary of State for the Home Department has yet to respond.
Whether or not the Court ultimately makes a declaration, the judgment already contains several important judicial statements, such as statements about the substantial interference that will be caused to family life in many cases, the limited value of a pre-entry language requirement in promoting integration, and the inadequacies of the Guidance. These statements should mean that, although the Rule itself has not been declared unlawful, more applications for entry clearance and appeals against refusals should now succeed on Article 8 grounds where the pre-entry English requirement has not been satisfied. The Secretary of State will also have to issue new and modified Guidance which properly reflects the court’s concerns.
The first appellant (Bibi) was represented by Manjit Singh Gill QC and Tony Muman, instructed by J M Wilson Solicitors.
The second appellant (Ali) was represented by Ramby De Mello and Abid Mahmood, instructed by Fountain Solicitors.
The judgment is available at
The Supreme Court has now given permission to appeal the Court of Appeal’s decision in SSHD v SS (Congo) & Ors  EWCA Civ 387. The court has directed that the appeal be heard on 22nd – 24th February 2016, alongside the case of MM (Lebanon).
The two cases deal with the government’s new Minimum Income Rules, which impose a minimum £18,600 income requirement before a non-EEA foreigner may join his or her partner in the UK. If the couple have a dependent child, this amount rises to £22,400, and increases further for every subsequent child. The income of the foreign partner on arrival in the UK is not taken into account, nor is any third party support, free accommodation, or savings the couple might have below the figure of £16,000.
Almost half the UK adult population do not meet these requirements, which are the highest in the world in relative terms, and the second highest in absolute terms. The impact on women, ethnic minorities, and those living in deprived areas is even worse, with a majority being deemed too poor to bring their foreign partner to the UK.
Because of the rules over 15,000 children, the vast majority British, are now living in enforced separation from one of their parents in what the Children’s Commissioner calls ‘Skype families‘. The Office for the Children’s Commissioner says:
“The Government is under a legal obligation to treat the best interests of children as a primary consideration when implementing rules and policies. The current family migration rules fall woefully short of this and children’s best interests are often reduced to a mere exception.“In an ongoing attempt to reduce migration the Government has introduced rules which are now adversely impacting on British citizen families and children. This must surely be an unintended consequence but one that must now be urgently addressed.
…“The result has been the separation of parents and children, heartache and misery. Some families cannot see how they can ever meet the rules and separation may be permanent.
I recently had to go to his school because he went through a period of anger … I understand he’s coming up to teenage years, but… he had a few anger issues and [talked] about wanting to smash things and not really hurting himself but wanting to break and smash stuff. He did also mention not wanting to live any more and he did go through a period of “why am I even bothering any more?” The doctor talked about the situation and asked him why he thought he was having those feelings and he said to her, “it’s because of my dad, because I can’t see my dad”. The doctor says we need to give him the tools to cope with his feelings as she knows we can’t fix it.”
There are countless more tens of thousands of British and UK settled residents kept apart from their partners due to their financial circumstances.
The case of MM deals with whether the rules are so harsh that they represent an inherently disproportionate interference in the right to a family life under Article 8 ECHR, or alternatively that they are lawful because the Secretary of State or a tribunal can allow cases on a discretionary basis even where the rules are not met. The case of SS looks at the width of that second stage – Theresa May arguing that consequences such as those identified above by the Children’s Commissioner are simply not good enough to qualify as an exception.
The Minimum Income Rules are the linchpin of the government’s immigration policy. The decision of the Supreme Court is likely to be the most significant human rights cases it has decided in years: in legal terms the extent to which government policy can determine the outcome of assessments of proportionality in Article 8, and in human terms by the tens of thousands of people’s lives it will affect.
The Court of Appeal has today handed down judgment in which it has allowed the Home Secretary’s appeal against Mr Justice Blake’s decision in MM and others v Secretary of State  EWHC 1900 Admin. The case concerns the Home Secretary’s controversial rules on family migration requiring that British Citizens or partners lawfully settled in the UK must show that they have an income of at least £18,600 p.a. with additional sums for each child before they can sponsor their foreign partners from outside the European Economic Area. The Court of Appeal has held that the requirements are lawful. The court reached this conclusion essentially on the basis that it was not for the court to analyse the basis of the Secretary of State’s decision to introduce such requirements into the immigration rules which are merely statements of administrative policy.
The test adopted by the court is the same as that which it adopted in Bibi  EWCA Civ 322 (the case concerning the English language requirement), namely that it is enough that the Secretary of State should have a ‘rational belief’ that the policy embodied in the requirements will achieve the identified aim. This is an extremely restrained form of judicial review and suggests a lack of willingness to interfere with governmental decisions. This test seems to conflict with the approach adopted by the Supreme Court in cases such as Baiai  UKHL 53 and Quila  UKSC 45 where the court adopted a rigorous analysis in assessing the evidence and used a test requiring the Secretary of State to show an objective justification. The Supreme Court has already granted permission to appeal in Bibi on arguments which include the argument that the test of a mere rational belief is wrong. It is likely that the present case will also proceed to the Supreme Court on an expedited basis. Whereas Mr Justice Blake’s decision had properly considered the detailed evidence provided by the claimants’ lawyers, the Court of Appeal barely considered it. The decision comes over four months after the appeals were heard in March 2014 and two years after the rules were introduced.
Since Mr Justice Blake’s decision, the Secretary of State has imposed a stay on considering applications which would otherwise have been refused for failure to satisfy the new rules. That stay will no doubt now be lifted. This will at least give people an opportunity to mount an appeal against negative decisions. In the meantime, a great many families who are never likely to be a burden on the state will have been kept apart. Applicants may however still succeed under Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights even if they cannot satisfy the minimum income requirements under the rules. The Court of Appeal rejected the suggestion in Nagre  EWHC 720 Admin that, if the rules cannot be satisfied, the applicant will need to show an arguable case before the decision-maker can move onto considering Article 8.
The Court of Appeal did not treat the rules on minimum income requirements as constituting a complete code for Article 8 purposes such that there was no need to consider Article 8 separately. Indeed, that was not the Secretary of State’s position. The Court of Appeal also noted the Guidance which had initially been produced in a draft form (only on the fourth day of the hearing before Mr Justice Blake) and the Guidance which had then been promulgated in final form after that hearing. That final Guidance directs caseworkers first to consider applications under the rules and, if the applicant does not meet the requirement of the rules, to move onto a second stage. Under that second stage caseworkers are required to consider “whether, based on an overall consideration of the facts of the case, there are exceptional circumstances which mean refusal of the application would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the individual or their family such that refusal would not be proportionate under Article 8. If there are such exceptional circumstances, leave outside the rules should be granted, if not, the application should be refused”.
The Court of Appeal has ruled that where the relevant group of immigration rules does not constitute a “complete code” then the proportionality test will be more at large, albeit guided by the Huang tests and UK and Strasbourg case law (see paragraph 134). In other words, unlike rules relating to the deportation of criminals, the application of Article 8 to cases which fail to satisfy the minimum income requirements will have to be carried out in any event in accordance with a straightforward Article 8 assessment. This is why the Court of Appeal goes on to say at paragraph 160 that if, as is suggested in the claimants’ evidence, decision makers have not been applying their minds to whether a “proportionality” test has to be used when considering “exceptional circumstances” in individual cases, the remedy lies in pursuing individual appeals and requiring decision-makers to apply the Huang and normal Article 8 tests. There is no other arguability or exceptionality standard. Therefore, it would seem that, much of Mr Justice Blake’s general comments as to proportionality will in any event be relevant to individual decisions, even if the rules are formally not unlawful.
So all is not lost just yet. The rules have forced significant numbers of British people to go and live in Europe for a reasonable period for time, in exercise of their rights as EU Citizens, before they lawfully come back months later with their spouses under EU law. In other cases, the rules have forced such persons out of the United Kingdom and out of Europe altogether, even though they are British or have been lawfully settled in the UK for many years. The impact on young people, part-time workers and women, particularly those from a racial minority background, who are more likely to be in low-paid jobs, has been particularly severe. The income threshold rules have received criticism from other quarters too. In June 2013, the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Migration issued a report which concluded that the rules were disproportionate. http://www.appgmigration.org.uk/family-inquiry. After the Court of Appeal’s ruling, all factors going to the harshness of the rules will have to be assessed in the context of Article 8 in individual cases.
Tony Muman is instructed on behalf of the First Respondent and the Interested Party and Joseph Neville is instructed on behalf of the Interested Party in this case. To instruct any member of our Immigration & Public Law team please contact the clerks.